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ee Accidental" Shootings as Fourth 
Amendment Seizures 
By KATHRYN R. URBONYA * 
After viewing the outrageous beating of Rodney King and after re-
peatedly reading of police officers "accidentally" firing their guns and 
killing suspects, the public has begun questioning the manner in which 
police officers arrest suspects. 1 Central to this inquiry is the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution,2 which prohibits unrea-
sonable seizures. 3 In the civil rights case brought by Mr. King, the focus 
• Professor of Law, Georgia State University. Fonner law clerk for United States Dis-
trict Judge G. Ernest Tidwell, Atlanta, Georgia, and North Dakota Supreme Court Justice 
Gerald W. VandeWalle. The author wishes to thank Geoffrey Alpert, Wayne LaFave, Paul 
Marcus, and John Warner for their incisive comments on early drafts of this article. The 
author would also like to acknowledge the research assistance provided by Debra Green and 
John Connolly, law students at Georgia State University, and by the College of Law through 
its research grant. 
1. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Law Enforcement: Implications of the Rodney King 
Beating, 28 CRIM. L. BULL. 469, 411 (1992) ("The not-guilty verdicts in [the Rodney King 
case] shocked the American public .... Although the deaths, injuries, and destruction to 
property can be counted, • . . the immediate damage to the social fabric of this country is 
immeasurable."); David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 501 (1992) ("As long as the courts and both federal and state govern-
ment treat police abuse as a series of isolated incidents, or as a regrettable by-product of the 
war on crime, the . . . Rodney Kings will continue to pay an unconscionable price for our 
misguided policies."); Charles Strum, Newark Police Start Plan With Safe Streets the Goal, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1992, at B4, C1 (Newark adopted a plan to put police officers on foot 
patrol after recent police shootings at teenagers involved in stealing automobiles resulted in 
numerous deaths.). 
2. U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. The Amendment provides in part: "The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated .... " Id. The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961); Wolfv. Colorado, 
338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), overruled in part, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 643 (1961) (all 
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution held to be inadmis-
sible in a state court). 
3. The Supreme Court has determined that three amendments of the United States Con-
stitution protect an individual's constitutional right to personal security: the Fourth Amend-
ment applies to individuals who have been "seized" by the use of "unreasonable" force; 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985); the 
Fourteenth Amendment applies to pretrial detainees who have been subject to "excessive force 
that amounts to punishment"; Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.lO; and the Eighth Amendment 
applies to prisoners who have been subject to the "malicious" use of force; Hudson v. McMil-
[337] 
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has been on the reasonableness of beating him.4 In stark comparison, 
some courts have failed to scrutinize the reasonableness of police officers 
shooting suspects because they have determined that the Fourth Amend-
ment was not even applicable. 5 After considering the circumstances of 
the shootings, they held that the shootings were "accidents," not Fourth 
Amendment "seizures."6 These decisions fail to understand the role of 
the Fourth Amendment. This failure has been in part engendered by the 
United States Supreme Court's difficulty in defining what conduct consti-
tutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure."7 For example, the Supreme Court 
has articulated three definitions of Fourth Amendment "seizures,''8 has 
lian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 998-99 (1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) (quoting 
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). The focus of this Article is on the right 
to personal security protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
4. See, e.g., Alpert et al., supra note 1, at 473 ("The City of Los Angeles and its police 
department, as well as individual officers, each [sic] faces astronomical civil judgments."). 
5. See generally text accompanying notes 156-214. 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 164-92 for a discussion of these cases. 
In Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), the United States Supreme Court 
stated that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to "the accidental effects of otherwise law-
ful governmental conduct." Id. at 596. See infra text accompanying notes 77-91 for a discus-
sion of this case. The word "accident," like the word "seizure," however, is not self-defining. 
If a court were to interpret broadly the word "accident," it could apply to all action in 
which no harm was specifically intended. This broad reading, however, is even inconsistent 
with the Court's narrowest "seizure" definition, which it specified in Brower. I d. at 599. In 
Brower the Court did not interpret the word "seizure" to require a specific intent to harm. !d. 
It found that a "seizure" occurs if a person was "stopped by the very instrumentality set in 
motion or put in place in order to achieve that result." Id. 
A narrow interpretation of the word "accident" would encompass only negligent conduct. 
In Brower the Court used examples of negligent conduct to show that the Fourth Amendment 
did not apply. Id. at 596-97. 
In short, the statement that the shooting was an "accident" for some courts constitutes a 
conclusion, not a mere description of conduct. Interpreting the scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment has historically involved balancing of interests, not an exegesis of the text of the amend-
ment. See infra notes 35,45-47, 51-55, 73 and accompanying text. The purpose of this Article 
is to focus on the conduct that precedes the shooting to show that the Fourth Amendment may 
be implicated prior to the shooting, however a court labels the shooting. 
7. See, e.g., Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as 
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEo. L.J. 19, 20 (1988) ("[T]here is virtual unanimity, transcending 
normal ideological dispute, that the Court has simply has made a mess of search and seizure 
law."). This article focuses on what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure" of a person, 
not of an object. See generally Wayne LaFave, The Fourth Amendment: A Bicentennial 
"Checkup," 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 223, 227 (1991) ("[T]he Court's definition of what constitutes 
a seizure of an object has been more straightforward and less controversial: 'some meaningful 
interference with an individual's possessory interests in ... property.'") (quoting United States 
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S 109, 113 (1984)). Even with a clearer definition of what constitutes 
"seizure" of property, the Court in the 1992 Term will determine if the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals erred in determining that state officials did not "seize" a person's mobile home 
when they disconnected it and towed it away from its lot. Soldal v. County of Cook, 942 F.2d 
1073, 1075 (7th Cir. 1991), cert granted, 112 S. Ct. 1290 (1992). 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 29-92. 
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used different approaches to justify its interpretations,9 and has repeat-
edly warned that an application of one of its definitions was limited to the 
facts of the particular case. 10 
The Court has not clarified the relationship among the three 
"seizure" definitions. In Terry v. Ohio, 11 the Court questioned whether 
"the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some 
way restrained the liberty of a citizen."12 In United States v. Menden-
hall, 13 the Court asked whether "in view of all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he 
was not free to leave."14 The Mendenhall definition, however, the Court 
recently modified in Florida v. Bostick. 15 It explained that the "free to 
leave" concept of Mendenhall is inapplicable when police officers ques-
tion bus passengers at a layover stop. 16 It explained that the modified 
Mendenhall definition focuses on "whether a reasonable person would 
feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the en-
counter."17 In contrast to the Mendenhall definition, which focuses on a 
reasonable person's response to the assertion of authority, the Court in 
Brower v. County of lnyo 18 stated a third "seizure" definition, which fo-
cuses on an officer's intent to assert authority. It declared that a 
"seizure" occurs when there is "a governmental termination of freedom 
of movement through means intentionally applied."19 Although all the 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 34, 45-47, 51-55, 77-82. 
10. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (1991) (prior "seizure" definition is 
inapplicable and must be modified to the facts of the case); Brower v. County of In yo, 489 U.S. 
593, 596-600 (1989) (majority opinion never mentions prior "seizure" definitions as it articu-
lates a new definition); Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988) (definition of Fourth 
Amendment "seizure" is "necessarily imprecise" because "what constitutes a restraint on lib-
erty .•. will vary, not only with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the setting 
in which the conduct occurs"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) ("We thus decide 
nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety of an investigative 'seizure' upon less 
than probable cause for purposes of 'detention' and/or interrogation. Obviously, not all per-
sonal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons.") See infra 
text accompanying notes 29-92 for a discussion of the Court's three "seizure" definitions. 
11. 392 u.s. 1 (1968). 
12. Id. at 19 n.16; see infra text accompanying notes 36-47 for a discussion of this 
definition. 
13. 446 u.s. 544 (1980). 
14. Id. at 554. (opinion of Stewart, J. and Rehnquist, J.); see also INS v. Delgado, 466 
U.S. 210, 215 (1984); see infra text accompanying notes 48-76 for a discussion of this 
definition. 
15. Ill s. Ct. 2382, 2387 (1992). 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. 489 u.s. 593 (1989). 
19. Id. at 597 (emphasis in original). See infra text accompanying notes 77-92 for a dis-
cussion of this definition. 
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definitions require an obvious assertion of authority,Z0 the last one also 
requires the "intentional" use of force.21 In analyzing police shootings, 
courts thus need to determine whether they must apply all of the defini-
tions, choose one that was articulated in a case with the most analogous 
facts, or craft a new definition for its particular facts. 
In determining what constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure, 
courts may also scrutinize the justifications the Court has given for its 
definitions. Although most Supreme Court decisions attempt to give 
meaning to the history of the Fourth Amendment,22 they reveal differ-
ences in emphasis. In deriving the Terry23 and MendenhalP4 broad defi-
nitions, the Court emphasized balancing: it balanced the need to subject 
the police practices to constitutional scrutiny against the state's interest 
in effective law enforcement. In its significantly narrower decision in 
Brower25 and its recent application of the prior definitions, 26 the Court 
has found guidance from dictionaries and the common law in interpret-
ing a Fourth Amendment "seizure."27 The Court's recent decisions re-
flect a movement to narrow drastically the Court's scrutiny of various 
police practices. 28 
20. See infra text accompanying notes 41-44, 66-72 for a discussion of the two categories 
of force created by the Supreme Court-a "show of authority" and physical force. 
21. See infra text accompanying notes 136-40 for a discussion of "intentional" use of 
force. 
22. See, e.g., Brower v. County oflnyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (the Fourth Amendment 
was a rejection of the use of writs of assistance and general warrants by English officials.). 
23. Terry, 392 U.S at 18 n.15 ("[T]he sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth 
Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security," (rather 
than to rely on an "overly technical definition"). 
24. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 ("[C]haracterizing every street encounter between a citi-
zen and the police as a 'seizure,' while not enhancing any interest secured by the Fourth 
Amendment, would impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate 
law enforcement practices."). · 
25. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596 (Intentional conduct is "implicit in the word 'seizure,' which 
can hardly be applied to an unknowing act."). 
26. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991). 
27. See infra text accompanying notes 74-75, 325-54 for a discussion of reliance on dic-
tionaries and the common law. 
28. The Court's decision in Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2387-88 (1991) suggested 
that sweeps of buses for drugs did not constitute a Fourth Amendment "seizure." See infra 
text accompanying notes 60-65 for a discussion of this case. Commentators have vehemently 
condemned the Court's narrow reading of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Wayne R. 
LaFave, Pinguitudinous Police, Pachydermatous Prey: Whence Fourth Amendment 
''Seizures"?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 729, 752 (The Court's decision in Bostick indicates "that 
lower courts are not to interfere with bus sweep procedures."); Tracey Maclin, Justice 
Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 11 CORNELL L. REv. 723, 800 
(1992) ("The Court's blind acceptance of police power produces distorted standards, ignores 
the real world, and destroys Fourth Amendment freedoms under the guise oflaw enforcement 
interests."); Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. 
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As a result of having three "seizure" definitions, different ap-
proaches to defining Fourth Amendment "seizures," and the context-
specific nature of any application of the definitions by the Supreme 
Court, how a particular court resolves the issue whether a police officer 
seized an individual by shooting implicitly depends upon its interpreta-
tion of the Fourth Amendment. 
This article contends that when police officers shoot at an individual 
during an investigation or attempted arrest they have effected a Fourth 
Amendment seizure. The justification for this view is largely derived 
from balancing the need to subject a police practice to constitutional 
scrutiny against the state's interest in law enforcement. Part I details the 
development of the "seizure" definitions by the Supreme Court. 
Although the Rehnquist Court appears to look to dictionaries and the 
common law for easy answers, Part I reveals that balancing has been 
implicit in all of its decisions regarding what constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment "seizure." Part II specifies some common shooting situa-
tions that police officers encounter. It reveals that whether a court deter-
mines that an individual has been seized depends upon which definition it 
applies and also how it interprets Brower's requirement that police of-
REv. 1, 80 n.262 (1991) (In suggesting that no "seizure" occurred during a bus sweep, "the 
Court was wrong in both result and rationale."). 
In California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551-52 (1991), the Supreme Court also 
determined that a police officer's footchase of a suspect did not implicate the Fourth Amend-
ment. See infra text accompanying notes 66-76 for a discussion of this case; see also LaFave, 
supra at 762 (The Court "unwisely and unnecessarily permit[s] the police to make serious 
intrusions upon the liberty and freedom of action of citizens without the need to offer even a 
modicum of justification."); Maclin, supra, at 751 ("[T]he police rather than the individual is 
[sic] now sovereign on the streets of America."); Hamida Abdal-Khallaq, Comment, Precedent 
for Hodari in Modem Supreme Court Cases-Does It Exist? An Analysis of California v. 
Hodari, 17 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 171, 172 (1991) (The Court furthers the goal of law en-
forcement by sacrificing "our fundamental right to Fourth Amendment protection against un-
reasonable seizures .... "). 
The Court's decision in Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989), similarly 
restricts the application of the Fourth Amendment by requiring officers to act intentionally 
when apprehending suspects. See infra text accompanying notes 77-92 for a discussion of this 
case; see also Ronald J. Bacigal, In Pursuit of the Elusive Fourth Amendment: The Police 
Chase Cases, 58 TENN. L. REv. 73, 115 (1990) (The court ignored society's interest in personal 
liberty as it pondered "far-fetched hypotheticals and formalistic concepts of causation and 
means intentionally applied."); Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right to Locomotion: The 
Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 15 CoRNELL L. REv. 1258, 1313 (1990) ("Fourth Amend-
ment protection should not depend on such slippery and deceptive conclusions about the pres-
ence of official intent, or whether official conduct resulted in acquiring physical control over a 
suspect."); Thomas K. Clancy, The Supreme Court's Search for a Definition of a Seizure: What 
is a "Seizure" of a Person Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. 
REv. 619, 647 (1990) ("Because the Brower test does not recognize the significance of intimi-
dating or coercive shows of authority, the test fails to properly balance individual and govern-
mental interests."). 
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fleers act intentionally. Part III briefly describes the relationship be-
tween the Fourth Amendment and the substantive due process 
component of the Fourteenth Amendment. It contends that the Fourth 
Amendment is the proper amendment under which to analyze police 
shootings. Parts IV proposes that the Court should adhere to its original 
definition in Terry-was there a "show of authority"-in evaluating 
whether an individual was seized. Part V argues that the balance should 
be struck in favor of constitutional scrutiny of the police practice under 
the Fourth Amendment. The appropriate place to show greater concern 
for the law enforcement interest is in the reasonableness prong of the 
Fourth Amendment.29 
I. The Court's Approach to Creating Three Definitions of 
Fourth Amendment "Seizures" 
Determining when police officers have "seized" an individual within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has been a difficult task for the 
United States Supreme Court. During an eight-year period, from 1983 to 
1991, the Court has issued six opinions on the scope of Fourth Amend-
ment seizures. 30 The Court's last three opinions unmistakably indicate a 
significant narrowing of the definition. 31 Even though lower courts can 
easily perceive the Court's direction, they face the task of applying three 
seizure definitions to shootings by police. 32 Analysis of these decisions 
indicates the morass the Court has created: whether an individual was 
"seized" depends upon which definition a court selects. 33 The problem is 
also exacerbated by the Court's failure to clarify how one should inter-
pret the Fourth Amendment. 34 The Court's jurisprudence has involved 
29. See infra text accompanying notes 361-68. 
30. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991); California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 
(1991); Brower v. County oflnyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989); Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567 
(1988); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
31. See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 28, at 645 ("[T]he Brower test is in direct conflict with the 
reasonable person analysis," which was the Court's prior standard.); LaFave, supra note 28, at 
734 (In the Hodari D. and Bostick decisions the Supreme Court failed to find a Fourth Amend-
ment "seizure" even though under its prior definitions a "seizure" definitely occurred.); 
Maclin, supra note 28, at 1314 (A rule requiring a pursued suspect to stop in order to implicate 
the Fourth Amendment "would fasten the final nail in the coffin for the right of locomotion."). 
32. See infra text accompanying notes 36-92 for a discussion of the Court's three seizure 
definitions. 
33. See infra text accompanying notes 156-258 for a discussion of the conflicting results 
lower courts have reached in applying the Court's seizure definitions to shootings by police 
officers. 
34. See infra text accompanying notes 42-44, 48-50, 78-82 for a discussion of the different 
approaches the Court has used in defining Fourth Amendment "seizures." 
Winter 1993] SHOOTINGS AS FOURTH AMENDMENT SEIZURES 343 
both balancing and the creation of "rigid" rules. 35 
A. The Terry Definition 
The concept of an investigatory stop was first defined in Terry v. 
Ohio,36 the Court's classic stop and frisk case. In determining whether 
such a stop was a Fourth Amendment "seizure" and whether a frisk was 
a Fourth Amendment "search, the Court evaluated the intrusiveness of 
the law enforcement practice upon an individual's interest in personal 
security.37 In Terry, a police officer watched individuals walk back and 
forth past a store many times. 38 Suspecting that they were going to rob 
the store, the officer approached them, identified himself as a police of-
ficer, and asked their names. 39 When Terry mumbled a response, the 
officer grabbed him.40 The Supreme Court determined that the officer 
had seized Terry when he grabbed him.41 In a footnote, the Court ar-
ticulated two types of compulsion officers employ in seizing individuals: 
"physical force" and a "show of authority."42 The Court stated, "Only 
when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in 
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 
'seizure' occurred."43 Because the grabbing constituted a clear seizure by 
the use of physical force, the Court found it unnecessary to determine if 
the police officer had effected a Fourth Amendment "seizure" by an as-
sertion of authority before he grabbed Terry.44 
The Court justified its definition by balancing "the sanctity of the 
person" with the state's interest in law enforcement.45 One significant 
factor it used in striking the balance in favor of the right to personal 
35. See, e.g., Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 7, at 22 (The Court has failed to explain 
why, when it is addressing Fourth Amendment issues, it sometimes uses balancing and some-
times uses "rigid" rules.). 
36. 392 u.s. 1 (1968). 
37. /d. at 16-18. 
38. /d. at 6. 
39. /d. at 6-7. 
40. /d. at 7. 
41. /d. at 19. 
42. /d. at 19 n.16. 
43. /d. 
44. /d. 
45. /d. at 16-19. In determining whether an investigatory stop and frisk implicated the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court first noted that each person has an interest in being " 'free from 
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.' " 
/d. at 9 (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). The Court deter-
mined that an investigatory stop does not infringe upon this right if it is based upon reasonable 
suspicion, given the weight of the government's interest in law enforcement and the limited 
intrusion upon the right to personal security. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27-30. Because the Court did 
not label the stop a "de minimis" intrusion outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment, it 
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security was "the degree of community resentment aroused by particular 
practices . . . . "46 In short, the Court refused "to isolate from constitu-
tional scrutiny the initial stages of the contact between the policeman and 
the citizen."47 
B. The Mendenhall Definition 
The Court articulated its second "seizure" definition in United 
States v. Mendenhal/.48 In this case the Court attempted to clarify 
Terry's "show of authority" prong by determining that a "seizure" oc-
curs "only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the inci-
dent, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 
leave."49 It declared that the following factors were relevant to that is-
sue: "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon 
by an officer, some physical touching of the person . . ., or the use of 
language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's 
request might be compelled."50 It did not, however, indicate how to 
weigh these factors. 
As with the Terry definition, the Court's second definition of a 
"seizure" in Mendenhall was based on balancing the interests of personal 
security against the state's interest in law enforcement. 5 1 Under this defi-
nition, however, the Court sought to limit the broad reach of Terry by 
distinguishing stops which are Fourth Amendment "seizures" from con-
sensual encounters52 which are not "seizures." Encounters, the Court 
affirmed the importance of the right to personal security and of subjecting police practice to 
scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 16-17. 
46. Id. at 17 n.14. 
47. Id. at 17. 
48. 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.). 
49. Id. at 554. 
50. Id. at 554. 
51. Id. at 553-54. The right to personal security, however, need not always be considered 
solely in opposition to the state's interest in law enforcement. Sometimes the Court character-
izes the right to personal security as a part of the state's interest in law enforcement. In Men-
denhall, 446 U.S. at 554, the Court placed both interests on the same side of the balance scale. 
It explained that "the security of all would be diminished" if police officers were not able to 
conduct investigations to identify those who are guilty of wrongdoing. I d. at 554 (quoting 
Hayres v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 503 (1963)). Professors Silas Wasserstrom and Michael 
Seidman have also noted this false conflict. See supra Wasserstrom & Seidman, note 7, at 65. 
They surmise that a resident of a crime-ridden area would welcome a law enforcement pro-
gram that would include "aggressive patrolling or random, warrantless searches and arrests 
.... " Id. at 65-66. In this situation, an interest in personal security is present on both sides of 
the balance: the person subject to the program has an interest in personal security, but so does 
the person who lives in the high-crime neighborhood. 
52. Id. at 555-56. The Court stated that if the contact was "otherwise inoffensive" then 
no "seizure" occurred. Id. at 555. The dichotomy between an encounter and a Fourth 
Amendment stop, however, is apparent to the Court, not to lower courts and scholars. Com-
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explained, allow police officers to ask citizens questions without implicat-
ing the Fourth Amendment. As long as a person "remains free to disre-
gard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion on that 
person's liberty or privacy .... " 53 In declaring that consensual en-
counters do not implicate the Fourth Amendment, the Court again bal-
anced interests, but this time determined that the state's interest was 
"legitimate" and that the individual had no interest in being free from 
questions. 54 The Mendenhall Court declared that characterizing all po-
lice/citizen encounters as seizures under the Fourth Amendment "would 
impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate 
law enforcement practices."55 
The Mendenhall definition of a seizure and the Court's subsequent 
applications of it, however, have been widely criticized as wholly unreal-
istic. 56 If the Mendenhall definition were literally interpreted, most ex-
changes between police officers and citizens would constitute Fourth 
Amendment "seizures" because most individuals confronted with ques-
tioning by police officers do not "feel free to leave." In applying the 
Mendenhall definition, the Court has nevertheless determined that most 
questioning is consensual. 
In attempting to understand the Court's perplexing applications of 
the Mendenhall definition, Professor Wayne LaFave has stated that the 
reasonable person that the Court envisions has incredibly thick skin, 
making it possible to resist the obvious assertion of authority by police 
pare State v. Gerrish, 815 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Or. 1991) (quoting State v. Holmes, 813 P.2d 28, 
34 (Or. 1991)) (Stopping at a roadblock was not a "seizure" because a roadblock is like" 'tap-
ping [a] citizen on the shoulder at the outset to get a citizen's attention'.") and In re Gissette, 
Angela P., 1992 WL 148206, leave to appeal granted, 581 N.Y.S. 259 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) 
(juvenile was not seized by officer asking numerous and demanding questions on a bus where 
there was limited or no movement allowed) with Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1210 (5th 
Cir. 1985) (roadblock constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure) and United States v. Wilson, 
953 F.2d 116, 123 (4th Cir. 1991) (officer seized suspect by walking alongside him, repeatedly 
asking permission to search coat). 
53. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. 
54. Id. at 554-55. 
55. Id. at 554. 
56. See, e.g., Tracy Maclin, The Decline of the Right to Locomotion: The Fourth Amend-
ment on the Streets, 15 Cornell L. Rev. 1258, 1303 (1990). Professor Maclin incisively summa-
rizes the problems with the Court's second definition: 
I d. 
It is unrealistic because few, if any, citizens will resist an officer's demands. It is 
unfair because it adopts the police officer's perspective, rather than the citizen's, in 
judging the constitutional validity of police invasions. After all, the Fourth Amend-
ment speaks of the rights of the people, not of the police. 
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officers57• Only such a person could perceive that there was freedom to 
.leave. For example, in INS. v. Delgado58 the Supreme Court held that 
Hispanic factory workers were not seized when some immigration agents 
stationed themselves at exits as other agents, armed with walkie-talkies 
and weapons, displayed their badges as they roamed about the factory 
asking questions. 59 Similarly, in Florida v. Bostick, 60 the Supreme Court 
implied that the lower court, on remand, should determine that an Mri-
can-American bus passenger, who was at a layover stop, was not seized 
by two police officers, who had badges and carried a gun in a "recogniza-
ble zipper pouch," as they questioned the passenger.61 Even though the 
passenger allowed the officer to inspect his ticket and identification, the 
police then asked to inspect his luggage as one of the officer's blocked his 
path to exit the bus. 62 The Supreme Court stated that understanding the 
Mendenhall definition requires sensitivity to the facts of the particular 
case. 63 It explained, "the 'free to leave' analysis . . . is inapplicable. " 64 
"In such a situation, the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable per-
son would feel free to decline the officers' requests .... " 65 These inter-
pretations of the Mendenhall definition may also suggest that the 
reasonable person that the Supreme Court envisions implicitly knows of 
her right to walk away or to terminate questioning and has faith in the 
integrity of the police, traits certainly not possessed by many minority 
suspects. 
In California v. Hodari D., 66 although the Court similarly narrowed 
the Terry/Mendenhall definition of what constitutes a "show of author-
ity" restricting a reasonable person's liberty, the Court nevertheless ex-
panded what type of physical force constitutes a "seizure" under its prior 
Terry definition.67 InHodari D., the Court declared that the Mendenhall 
definition merely states a "necessary but not sufficient condition for 
seizure.''68 The Court ruled that a Terry/Mendenhall "show of author-
57. See LaFave, supra note 28, at 734-740 ("The Court finds a perceived freedom to de-
part in circumstances when only the most thick-skinned of suspects would think such a choice 
was open them."). 
58. 466 u.s. 210 (1984). 
59. Id. at 212, 219. 
60. 111 s. Ct. 2382 (1991). 
61. Id. at 2387-88. 
62. Id. at 2385. 
63. Id. at 2386-87. 
64. Id. at 2387. 
65. Id. 
66. 111 s. Ct. 1547 (1991). 
67. ld. at 1550. 
68. ld. at 1551. Under this approach, the Court can drastically limit the doctrine of stare 
decisis by merely declaring prior cases did not articulate all the requirements necessary to 
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ity" is insufficient; there must also be compliance with the shown author-
ity.69 In dicta, however, the Court explained that if officers use physical 
force, voluntary compliance is not necessary.70 The Court broadly 
stated, "To constitute an arrest ... the mere grasping or application of 
physical force with lawful authority, whether or not it succeeded in sub-
duing the arrestee, [is] sufficient."71 It thus added two bright-line rules 
to a fuzzy definition: if an individual does not stop then there is no 
seizure even if there was a "show of authority," but if officers use physi-
cal force, then voluntary compliance is not necessary. Therefore, even if 
a footchase constitutes a "show of authority," no seizure occurs until the 
individual stops. 72 
In crafting this limitation, the Hodari Court not only balanced inter-
ests, 73 but it also found guidance from dictionaries 74 and some aspects of 
fulfill a particular legal standard. In short, this practice would allow the court to change well-
established law without requiring reasons for doing so. 
69. /d. at 1550-51. 
70. /d. at 1551. 
71. ld at 1550. 
72. /d. at 1552. 
73. /d. at 1551. The Court stated, "We do not think it desirable, even as a policy matter, 
to stretch the Fourth Amendment beyond its words and beyond the meaning of arrest ..•. 
Street pursuits always place the public at some risk, and compliance with police orders to stop 
should therefore be encouraged." /d. Even though the Court's interpretation of the role of 
language in constitutional adjudication is naive, balancing is similarly subject to manipulation 
based on personal preferences. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 
U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1186-87 (1989) (Judges should favor general rules to balancing tests 
because the latter compels judges to act more like "fact-finders [rather] than as expositors of 
the law."); Maclin, supra note 28, at 1303 ("[T]he inevitable result of [F]ourth [A]mendment 
jurisprudence keyed to balancing or sound social policy is to 'give the police the upper hand'.") 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). 
74. See 111 S. Ct. at 1549 (1992) ("From the time of the founding to the present, the word 
'seizure' has meant a 'taking possession' .•. . ")(citing NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DIC-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 67 (1828); 2 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY 
510 (6th ed. 1856); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2057 (1981). See 
generally Scalia, supra note 73, at 1184. 
In this recent article, Justice Scalia, the author of Hodari D., stated that the task of deriv-
ing general rules is perhaps easier for him than for other judges because he is "more inclined to 
adhere closely to the plain meaning of a text." /d. He explained that this was his approach for 
determining what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure." /d. To illustrate his approach, 
he cited his concurring opinion in Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988). In Chesternut, 
the Court determined that police officers had not seized a suspect by following him in a cruiser. 
486 U.S. at 574-75. The majority opinion refused to adopt two proposed bright-line rules: a 
suspect must stop before a seizure can occur, or that all chases are Fourth Amendment 
seizures. /d. at 572-73. In the concurring opinion, however, Justice Scalia agreed with Justice 
Kennedy's adoption of the first proposed bright-line rule-a "seizure" does not occur until the 
suspect actually stops, the view later adopted in Hodari D. /d. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring). Justice Scalia in his article maintained that his approach to determining what consti-
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the common law.75 The Court's dictum-that the use of any physical 
force that actually touches an individual would constitute a "seizure"-
appears in conflict with its third "seizure" definition, articulated just 
three years before in Brower v. County of lnyo. 76 
C. The Brower Definition 
The confusion about the relationship among the Court's "seizure" 
definitions is apparent in Brower v. County of lnyo. 77 In Brower, the ma-
jority opinion not only articulated a third definition 78 without ever men-
tioning its prior definitions, but it implicitly balanced the parties' interest 
as it attempted to distinguish a constitutional tort under the Fourth 
Amendment from an ordinary state tort. 79 Its explicit vehicle for nar-
rowing the scope of the constitutional tort was its interpretation of the 
word "seizure." The Court explained that only intentional conduct can 
create a Fourth Amendment "seizure" because the word "seizure" "can 
tutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure" is much better than the Court's imprecise test of 
examining all of the circumstances to ascertain if the police conduct was coercive. 
Many scholars, however, do not accept textual analysis with the same confidence as Jus-
tice Scalia does. See, e.g., HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 80 (1990) (A textual argument 
is actually "an appeal to values and morality."); Peter C. Schanck, The Only Game in Town: 
An Introduction to Interpretive Theory, Statutory Construction, and Legislative Histories, 38 
KAN. L. REv. 815, 860-61 (1990) (Conventionalism "teaches that there is no transcendently 
right interpretive practice [and] that we cannot step outside our own interpretative community 
to judge its conventions.'"); Wasserstrom and Seidman, supra note 7, at 54 n.140 ("[I]t is not 
possible to generate a determinate body of rules governing searches and seizures from a simple 
reading of the constitutional text"); Note, The Dictionary and the Law, J. LEGAL Hisr. 389, 
391 (1989) (A dictionary is not the source to resolve legal disputes.). 
75. See, e.g., Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1551 n.3 (Common law "defines the limits of a 
seizure of the person.") In Hodari D. the Supreme Court selectively used the common law to 
interpret the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1150-51. It rejected using the common law on at-
tempted arrest, but adopted the common law as it applied to actual arrests. Id. It failed to 
explain not only why the common law was significant, but also why it selectively chose certain 
aspects ofit to shed light on what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure." See, e.g., Kathy 
R. Mahrt, Note, Seizure and the Fourth Amendment: The Meaning and Implications of Cali-
fornia v. Hodari, 25 CREIGHTON L. REv. 213, 231 (1991) ("Our interpretation of the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment as it has grown over the last twenty-five years should define the scope of a 
seizure, not the common law of arrest."); see infra text accompanying notes 339-43 for a dis-
cussion of the Court's inconsistent application of the common law to Fourth Amendment 
issues. 
76. 489 U.S. 593 (1989). See infra text accompanying notes 77-92 for a discussion of this 
case. 
77. 489 u.s. 593 (1989). 
78. Id. at 596-97. A "seizure" occurs under the third definition "whenever there is a 
governmentally caused termination of an individual's freedom of movement ... through means 
intentionally applied." I d. (emphasis in original). 
79. I d. at 596. A state tort occurs, according to the Court, if "a parked and unoccupied 
police car slips its brake" and injures someone. Id. 
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hardly be applied to an unknowing act."80 It thus created a dichotomy 
for analyzing the display of force by police officers: whether there a "mis-
use of power"81 or just an "accident."82 
The Court derived this dichotomy by considering only the two ex-
tremes of conduct-negligence and intentional acts. 83 In Brower, the 
Court held that police officers had seized a pursued driver by intention-
ally setting up a roadblock on a curve that stopped the pursued individ-
ual by killing him. 84 It contrasted this clear intentional conduct with 
negligent behavior. 85 The Court explained that if police officers acciden-
tally pin a serial killer against a wall with their cruiser, there would be no 
Fourth Amendment seizure. 86 If, however, the officers intentionally 
"sideswipe[]" a fleeing car, causing a crash, then there would be a 
seizure. 87 The Court's definition of "intentional" conduct focuses atten-
tion on the intent to stop a suspect, not the intent to harm a person. 88 
The Court explained that intentional conduct should be measured objec-
tively by focusing on the means used to stop a suspect. 89 A seizure oc-
curs if a person is "stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or 
put in place in order to achieve that result."90 This clarification, the 
Court stated, was necessary because otherwise it would "be driven to 
saying that one is not seized who has been stopped by the accidental 
discharge of a gun with which he was meant only to be bludgeoned, or by 
a bullet in the heart that was meant only for the leg."91 The Court thus 
impliedly defines objective intent as the desire to bring about the stated 
physical consequence of stopping, not of a particular physical harm. 
The significance of this third definition is unclear. Since the Brower 
decision, some courts have interpreted Brower to require an intent to 
cause a particular harm, not the intent to cause a suspect to stop. 92 The 
confusion arising from the Brower definition is understandable. Brower 
raises questions as to the significance of police officers' drawing their 
weapons and using them. Analysis of common situations resulting in 
80. Id. at 596. 
81. Id. (quoting Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927)). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 596-97. 
84. Id. at 599-600. 
85. Id. at 596-97. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 597. 
88. Id. at 599. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 599. 
91. Id at 598-99 (emphasis added). The Court explained that a court should not "draw 
too fine a line" in examining the means used to cause a suspect to stop. Id at 598. 
92. See infra text accompanying notes 185-92, 220-26, 249-54. 
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shooting reveals not only the complexities associated with the Brower 
definition, but also confusion arising from the three "seizure" definitions. 
II. The Use of Weapons by Police Officers: Applying the 
Three "Seizure" Definitions 
Police officers may attempt to stop individuals by asking or com-
manding them to stop, by displaying their guns, or by injuring them.93 
Within each category, of course, are numerous factual distinctions. Ap-
plication of the three "seizure" definitions to various situations in which 
police officers use their weapons reveals the difficult tasks courts face in 
determining whether a "seizure" occurred. Some conduct is clearly a 
seizure under any definition;94 some conduct, however, is a "seizure" 
under the Terry and Mendenhall definitions, but not a "seizure" under 
the Brower definition. 95 In addition, conflicting interpretations of the ap-
plication of these definitions is also possible. In short, as Professors Silas 
Wasserstrom and Michael Seidman have accurately stated, "the Court 
simply has made a mess of search and seizure law."96 
A. The Display of a Weapon 
Because the Supreme Court created a distinction between en-
counters, which are not governed by the Fourth Amendment, and inves-
tigatory stops, which do constitute Fourth Amendment seizures, the 
mere presence of a gun on a police officer is insufficient to label any ex-
change between officers and citizens as a stop.97 The average citizen ex-
pects to view a police officer carrying a gun. The question of when 
conduct amounts to a "seizure" arises when police officers remove guns 
93. The greatest source of controversy arises when police officers use their guns to effect 
an arrest, not when they act in self-defense. See, e.g., GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & LoRIE A. 
FiuDELL, POLICE VEHICLES AND FIREARMS: INSTRUMENTS OF DEADLY FORCE 70 (1992). 
Some police departments do not have a firearms policy. I d. at 73. Those departments that do 
have policies disagree as to the circumstances under which the use of weapons is appropriate. 
ld. at 70-71. Some allow officers to use deadly force to effect an arrest when the suspect has 
committed a forcible felony, such as "murder, arson, mayhem, burglary, aggravated assault, 
rape, kidnapping, extortion, or robbery." Id. at 71. Others allow police to use deadly force 
only when " 'someone's life is in direct jeopardy even if the suspect has allegedly committed a 
heinous crime and was believed to be dangerous.'" Id. (quoting David B. Griswold, Control-
ling the Police Use of Deadly Force: Exploring the Alternatives, 4 AM. JuR. Police 93, 103 
(1985)). 
94. See infra text accompanying notes 116-18. 
95. See infra text accompanying notes 101, 145-47, 154-55, 238-42, 271-83. 
96. Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 7, at 20. 
97. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 210, 212 (1984) (no seizure occurred when 
officers with holstered guns approached suspects and asked them questions). 
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from their holsters and point them at suspects.98 Under the Court's re-
cent decision in California v. Hodari D.,99 which purports to interpret the 
Terry/Mendenhall "show of authority" prong, 100 the conduct would be a 
seizure only if the suspect stops; under the Brower definition, a "seizure" 
occurs only if the officers intentionally acquired physical control of the 
suspect. 101 
Only the Court's recent decision in Hodari D. discussed all three 
"seizure" definitions. In one sense, it reaffirmed the vitality of Terry by 
declaring two categories of Fourth Amendment seizures: those in which 
the officers use physical force and those in which suspects stop as a result 
of a Terry/Mendenhall "show of authority."102 In the first category the 
mere touching of a person can constitute a Fourth Amendment 
"seizure." 103 In contrast, if there were just a show of authority, then the 
suspect would have to stop in response to this assertion for there to be a 
Fourth Amendment "seizure." 
Under Hodari D., pointing a gun at a suspect would constitute a 
"seizure" only if the suspect stopped as a result of this assertion of au-
thority. If the suspect ran, then there would be no Fourth Amendment 
seizure. 104 
This approach to Fourth Amendment "seizures" leads, however, to 
the debatable conclusion that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated 
when police officers repeatedly shoot at suspects, but miss them. 105 In 
Cameron v. City of Pontiac106 a suspect was killed by a car as he ran to 
avoid gunfire from police officers. 107 In this situation the Sixth Circuit 
held that was no Fourth Amendment "seizure," despite the obvious 
"show of authority" through the shooting, because the suspect did not 
98. See infra text accompanying notes 104, 116-18. 
99. 111 s. Ct. 1547 (1991). 
100. See supra text accompanying notes 36-76 for a discussion of the Terry and Mendenhall 
definitions. 
101. See supra text accompanying notes 77-92 for a discussion of the Brower definition. 
102. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1550-52. 
103. I d. at 1550. Although the Hodari D. decision does suggest that the a "mere touching" 
could constitute a Fourth Amendment "seizure," a touching that is like a touching from an 
ordinary citizen would probably not constitute a "seizure." See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 28, at 
737 ("physical contact is acceptable if it is 'a normal means of attracting a person's atten-
tion.'") (quoting United States v. Burreii, 286 A.2d 845, 846 (D.C. 1972)). 
104. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991). 
105. Dissenting in Hodari D., Justices Stevens and Marshaii criticized the Court's narrow 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. I d. at 1552-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting). They stated, 
"a police officer may now fire his weapon at an innocent citizen and not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment-as long as he misses his target.'' Id. at 1552. 
106. Cameron v. City of Pontiac, 813 F.2d 782, 784 (6th Cir. 1987). 
107. ld. 
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comply with it. 108 
The Sixth Circuit's holding is consistent with Hodari D., which rein-
terpreted Terry and Mendenhall to require compliance with a show of 
authority.109 Prior to the compliance requirement, shooting at a suspect 
could have constituted a "show of authority," which would have allowed 
the courts to scrutinize whether the police conduct was reasonable. For 
example, under the earlier interpretations of Terry and Mendenhall, the 
moment officers use sirens in an attempt to stop someone110 or as soon as 
they begin chasing a suspect, "the stop has begun."111 The Hodari D. 
restriction of the Mendenhall definition, however, suggests that the 
seizure begins when the suspect stops. 
The Hodari D. limitation further undermines an individual's interest 
in personal security, particularly when one considers that the majority of 
bullets fired by police officers do not hit their intended targets. 112 In 
Terry the Court created a reasonable suspicion standard that allowed po-
lice officers to stop individuals for limited questioning, 113 even though the 
language of the Fourth Amendment suggests that a "probable cause" 
standard could have been necessary for these exchanges. 114 The Court, 
however, balanced the need for law enforcement against this more lim-
ited intrusion into privacy. The individual's interest in privacy, it de-
clared, could be protected by the reasonableness clause: "In our view the 
sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth Amendment governs all 
intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security, and to make 
the scope of the particular intrusion, in light of all the exigencies of the 
108. Id. at 785. 
109. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1552 (1991). 
110. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 546 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1976) ("seizure oc-
curs when the officer first communicates the command to halt"). 
111. See, e.g., In re D.J., 532 A.2d 138, 140 (D.C. 1987); LaFave, supra note 28, at 758-62. 
112. See, e.g. GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & LoRIE A. FRIDELL, POLICE VEHICLES AND FIRE-
ARMS: INSTRUMENTS OF DEADLY FORCE, 41 (1991) (in analyzing police shootings in fifty 
largest cities in the United States, 52% of all shots resulted in misses); 1992 studies by Geller 
and Alpert, to be added in September, will document the frequencies of and some covert rea-
sons for "accidental" shootings; WILLIAM GELLER, DEADLY FORCE: WHAT WE KNOW 194 
(1992) (several studies "show relatively high levels of accidental gun discharges or accidental 
shootings of persons by police officers during different time periods": Chicago, 9% in 1974-
1983, 15% in 1991; Boston, 27% in the 1970s; New York City, 13% in 1971-75, 24% in 1987, 
23% in 1990). 
113. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) ("[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the po-
lice officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."). 
114. Id. at 35 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[l]t is a mystery how that 'search' and that 
'seizure' can be constitutional by Fourth Amendment standards, unless there was 'probable 
cause' to believe that (1) a crime had been committed or (2) a crime was in the process of being 
committed or (3) a crime was about to be committed."). 
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case, a central element in the analysis ofreasonableness."115 In contrast, 
the Hodari D. narrow "seizure" definition fails to discern any intrusion 
of the right to personal security when police officers shoot at individuals 
and miss them. 
Similar narrow interpretations of what constitutes a Fourth Amend-
ment "seizure" occur when applying the Brower "seizure" definition both 
to the mere display of weapons and to shootings missing their targets. 
Under Brower, a police officer who points a gun at a suspect effectuates a 
Fourth Amendment "seizure" only if there was "an intentional acquisi-
tion of physical control."116 Like theHodari D. definition, an actual stop 
is perhaps what the Court means by "physical control."117 In contrast to 
the Hodari D. definition, if the stop were caused by the use of physical 
force, then voluntary compliance would not be necessary. The Brower 
Court explained that for the purpose of determining whether a seizure 
occurred it would not distinguish between a roadblock designed to give a 
pursued the option to stop and one designed to produce a collision. 118 
Under the Brower decision, an officer thus seizes a suspect by point-
ing a gun if the suspect stops. The drawing of the gun is an intentional 
act that produces physical control over the suspect. But if the officer 
shoots at the suspect, misses the target, and the suspect flees, then the 
officer has not acquired physical control over the suspect. Under both 
the Brower and Hodari definitions, shootings at citizens are not governed 
by the Fourth Amendment as long as police officers miss and the citizens 
continue to flee. Under Brower, no "seizure" occurs because the shooting 
does not result in physical control over the suspect, and under Hodari D., 
no seizure occurs because the suspect has not complied with the "show of 
authority" as manifested by the shooting. In short, these "seizure" defi-
nition severely narrowed the scope of the Fourth Amendment because 
they shield this common and dangerous police practice from review 
under the Fourth Amendment while permitting review when individuals 
stop in response to other types of coercive conduct, such as verbal 
demands. 
115. /d. at 18 n.15. 
116. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989). 
117. See, e.g., Willhauck v. Halpin, 953 F.2d 689, 716 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Brower 489 
U.S. at 597 (1989) (A seizure occurs when the suspect stops in response to signalling because at 
that point the officer has "physical control" over the suspect)). (quoting Brower v. County of 
lnyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989)). 
118. Brower, 489 U.S. at 599. 
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B. Shooting Citizens 
Applying the Court's "seizure" definitions to shootings resulting in 
injuries to suspects and bystanders is also difficult. Litigation has in-
cluded the following common situations: 1) the intentional killing of a 
suspect; 119 2) the intentional firing at a suspect who becomes injured yet 
continues to fiee; 120 3) "accidental shootings," e.g., the withdrawal of a 
gun to stop a suspect, which fires as the officer approaches a suspect, 121 
or the firing of a gun after the suspect has stopped in response to the 
officer's show of authority; 122 and 4) the firing of a gun at a suspect which 
results in injury either to a known passenger123 or an unknown by-
stander. 124 Central to resolution of the "seizure" issue is examination of 
what the Hodari D. Court meant by "physical force" and what the 
Brower Court meant by "intentional" conduct. 
1. Intentional Killing of Suspects 
The easiest application of the Court's seizure definitions involves 
clear, intentional conduct: shootings designed to stop suspects by killing 
them and shootings in self-defense. Yet, even in this context, courts have 
disagreed as to what type of conduct on the part of police is intentional, 
as opposed to reckless or grossly negligent. 
The Supreme Court evaluated a shooting designed to kill a suspect 
in Tennessee v. Garner. 125 In Garner, a police officer saw a burglary sus-
pect fleeing from a house. 126 When the suspect ignored the officer's com-
mand to halt, the officer intentionally shot the suspect in order to stop 
him. 127 The issue of whether there was a "seizure" merited only a two-
sentence discussion from the Court. 128 It stated, "there can be no ques-
tion that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to 
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment."129 In reach-
119. See infra text accompanying notes 125-51 for a discussion of intentional killings of 
suspects. 
120. See infra text accompanying notes 152-55 for a discussion intentional injuries to 
suspects. 
121. See infra text accompanying notes 156-214. 
122. See infra text accompanying notes 215-58. 
123. See infra text accompanying notes 259-84 for a discussion of injuries to a known 
passenger. 
124. See infra text accompanying notes 285-88 for a discussion of injuries to an unknown 
bystander. 
125. 471 u.s. 1 (1985). 
126. Id. at 3. 
127. /d. at 4. 
128. Id. at 7. 
129. Id. 
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ing this conclusion, the Court did not qualify the types of killings that 
constitute "seizures." It only noted that the suspect died as a result of 
the intentional shooting. 130 
Similarly, in Brower v. County of lnyo, 131 police officers stopped a 
pursued driver by using deadly force, this time in the form of a road-
block. 132 Just like the fleeing victim in Garner, the pursued driver re-
fused to stop. 133 Even though the suspect did not voluntarily comply 
with the police officers' show of authority as manifested by the road-
block, police officers used physical force to effectuate a stop. The Brower 
held that police officers seized the driver when he hit the roadblock and 
stopped. 134 
Thus under both Garner and Brower voluntary compliance with a 
show of authority is not necessary if police officers intentionally cause a 
stop using physical force. In Garner the officer intentionally shot his 
gun, 135 and in Brower, the officers intentionally established a roadblock. 
Although both Garner and Brower involved obvious intentional con-
duct by the police, courts have disagreed as to how to evaluate an inten-
tional killing when the officer asserts that the shooting was in self-
defense. 136 Even though a jury may resolve the issue of whether the of-
ficer acted intentionally, 137 some courts have prevented the issue from 
going to trial by determining that no "seizure" occurred. For example, 
in Estate of Jackson v. City of Rochester, 138 a federal district court in New 
York held that a police officer did not seize a suspect by shooting him 
because the purpose of the shooting was to act in self defense, not to 
effectuate a Fourth Amendment "investigatory stop."139 It also declared 
that the Fourth Amendment was not applicable to the shooting because 
130. Id. at 11. 
131. 489 U.S. 593 (1989); see supra text accompanying notes 77-92 for a discussion of this 
case. 
132. Brower, 489 U.S. at 595 (1989). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 599. 
135. See generally Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209, 1217 (1st Cir. 1986) (intentional 
killing of suspect stated claim under the Fourth Amendment). 
136. Compare Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 329 (9th Cir. 1989) (shooting constituted a 
"seizure"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 
1502 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986); Loria v. Town oflrondequoit, 775 F. 
Supp. 599, 604 (W.D.N.Y. 1990); with Estate of Jackson v. City of Rochester, 705 F. Supp. 
779, 786 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (no seizure); see also Frank G. Zarb, Police Liability for Creating 
the Need to Use Deadly Force in Self-Defense, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1982, 1995-2002 (1988) (ex-
cellent examination of the issues associated with self-defense shootings by police officers). 
137. See, e.g., Loria v. Town of Inrondequoit, 775 F. Supp. 599, 604 (W.D.N.Y. 1990); 
Keller v. Frink, 745 F. Supp. 1428, 1432 (S.D. Ind. 1990). 
138. 705 F. Supp. 779 (W.D.N.Y. 1989). 
139. Id. at 786. 
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it occurred after a "completed" investigatory stop. 140 
In conflict with this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is the 
same court's subsequent decision in Loria v. Town of Irondequoit. 141 In 
Loria, it held that a "seizure" occurred when a police officer shot a sus-
pect in self-defense. 142 The Loria court explained that the officer's mo-
tive in using the gun goes to the issue of reasonableness, not to the issue 
of whether there was a Fourth Amendment "seizure."143 It explained 
that the Fourth Amendment would thus be implicated if the jury deter-
mined either that "he drew his weapon intending to use it, or that he .. 
meant to fire it at the time of discharge."144 
The disagreement as to whether the Fourth Amendment is impli-
cated when officers assert that a shooting was in self-defense appears to 
focus on the scope of the Brower "seizure" definition. In Brower, the 
Supreme Court emphasized that a "seizure" requires "an intentional ac-
quisition of physical control" which causes the suspect to stop, whether 
voluntarily or involuntarily. 145 Determining whether the Fourth 
Amendment is implicated during a shooting allegedly done in self-de-
fense should not depend upon whether it occurred before or soon after 
the suspect stops. A self-defense shooting is itself an admitted intentional 
act. If the act result in physical control of a suspect, then the Fourth 
Amendment should be considered implicated because it meets even the 
restrictive Brower "seizure" definition. The Loria court explained that a 
contrary view would result in an "overly restrictive" interpretation of 
Brower. 146 Determining that a "seizure" occurred when officers inten-
tionally kill a suspect during an investigatory stop or while acting in self-
defense is also consistent with the Hodari D. Court's dicta about the use 
of physical force. 147 Although Hodari D. defined when a seizure occurs 
in the absence of physical force, it nonetheless made some broad state-
ments about the use of physical force. It stated that "the mere touching 
of a person would suffice" as a "seizure."148 In addition, it explained 
140. Id. 
141. 775 F. Supp. 599 (W.D.N.Y. 1990). 
142. Id. at 604. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 603-04. It stated that a jury could determine that the officer intended to use the 
gun within the meaning of Brower not only because the gun had to have been cocked before 
using it, but also because six pounds of force was necessary to pull the trigger. Id. 
145. Brewer, 489 U.S. at 596. 
146. Loria, 775 F. Supp. at 603-04. 
147. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1550 (1991). 
148. Id. at 1550 n.2 (1991). The Court never adequately explained its use of the common 
law in determining what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure." At one point the Court 
stated that it is "irrelevant that English law proscribed 'an unlawful attempt to take a pre-
sumptively innocent person into custody.'" Id. (emphasis in original). In contrast, the Court 
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that if the person escaped control after the touching, the arrest did not 
continue. 149 It also stated that a "seizure" could be a "single act, ... not 
a continuous fact." 150 With this broad interpretation of physical force, 
the Hodari D. dicta thus resembles the Terry Court, which stated that the 
use of physical force constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure. 151 
Under all three Supreme Court "seizure" definitions-Terry, 
Brower, and Hodari, which modified the Mendenhall definition-police 
officers thus seize individuals within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment when they intentionally kill them. . These shootings generally do 
not engender complex questions as to the scope of the Court's "seizure" 
definitions because the police officers admit that they intentionally killed 
the suspects, whether during an investigation or as an act of self-defense. 
2. Intentional Injury of Fleeing Suspects 
A more complex case occurs when a suspect flees after being shot by 
police officers. 152 Whether a Fourth Amendment seizure occurred de-
pends upon which seizure definition a court applies. Under Terry and 
Hodari D.'s dicta 153 on physical force, a seizure occurs when the bullet 
hits the suspect because the officer has used physical force. Under 
Brower, however, that conclusion is debatable because one may interpret 
the Court's decision to exclude physical force that does not cause an im-
mediate stop or one shortly after the use of physical force. 
In declaring another "seizure" definition, the Brower Court did not 
adopt a physical-injury litmus test for Fourth Amendment "seizure." It 
explained that a "seizure" occurs only when officers act intentionally, 
did find relevant the common law when an officer has actual custody of an individual. Id. To 
justify its conclusions, the Court relied on its notion of what type of conduct implicates the 
Fourth Amendment. Id. This latter justification is implicitly related to balancing. In this 
context the Court failed to discern the significance of personal liberty. It tersely explained that 
even though "street pursuits always place the public at some risk, ... compliance with police 
orders to stop should be therefore encouraged." Id. at 1551. 
149. Id. at 1550. 
150. Id. (comparing Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 471 (1873)). 
151. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). 
152. See, e.g., Cooper v. Merrill, 736 F. Supp. 552, 557 (D. Del. 1990) (the first shot hitting 
the suspect caused him to gasp, but not to stop; he continued toward the officer, who fired two 
more times; the suspect escaped but fell over some bushes; officer later hit him twice as suspect 
attempted to give himself up). In Cooper, the police officer admitted that he seized the suspect 
by shooting him. 736 F. Supp. at 559. 
153. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1550 ("To constitute an arrest ... the mere grasping or 
application of physical force with lawful authority, whether or not it succeeded in subduing the 
arrestee, was sufficient"). The Court also cites an 1862 case to support its view of physical 
force: "officer effects an arrest of a person whom he has authority to arrest, by laying his hand 
on him for the purpose of arresting him, though he may not succeed in stopping and holding 
him") Id. (citing Whitehead v. Keyes, 85 Mass. 495, 501 (1862)). 
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regardless of the harm caused by police officers. It stated that if an of-
ficer's parked cruiser accidentally "slips its brake and pins" an innocent 
bystander or a serial killer, no seizure has occurred. 154 Few, however, 
would dispute the Court's conclusions here because these situations in-
volve obvious negligence claims unrelated to investigations and arrests. 
Under Brower there is no "seizure" because the officers objectively did 
not intend to stop the bystander or the killer by using their cruiser as a 
weapon. 
Application of the Brower definition to the injured fleeing suspect 
reveals some of the problems with the definition. In this situation, there 
is an objective intent to stop the suspect as demonstrated by aiming the 
gun and repeatedly hitting the suspect. What is missing, however, is the 
actual stop. The Brower Court stated that it is "enough for a seizure that 
a person be stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in 
place in order to achieve that result."155 In other words, there must be 
both the intent to stop and a stop caused by the intent to stop. The 
Brower definition does not clarify when an individual must stop in re-
sponse to an officers use of physical force. For example, it is unclear if 
the Brower definition would bar recovery for injuries arising from a 
shooting in which the suspect fled and was captured the next day or if the 
person died the next day as a result of the shooting. 
In this situation, whether an injured fleeing suspect has been seized 
depends upon which definition a court applies. Under both Terry and 
Hodari D.'s dicta, a seizure occurs when the officer's bullet hits the sus-
pects because the bullet represents the use of physical force; however, 
under Brower, one may contend that a "seizure" occurs only when the 
suspect stops shortly after being injured. Consequently, in this situation, 
application of the Court's seizure definitions results in conflicting conclu-
sions as to the scope of the Fourth Amendment. 
3. "Accidental Shootings" of Suspects 
The Brower definition of a "seizure," in contrast to the Terry and 
Hodari D.'s definitions, also similarly shields "accidental shootings" 
from scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment. 156 Two situations are com-
mon: guns "accidentally" discharge as police officers approach a sus-
pect157 and guns "accidentally" discharge as they arrest someone who 
154. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989). 
155. Id. at 599 (emphasis added). 
156. See infra text accompanying notes 157-290 for a discussion of cases in which courts 
have failed to find the Fourth Amendment implicated because the officers did not intend to 
shoot their weapons. 
157. See infra text accompanying notes 159-214. 
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has stopped. 158 The central issue is to understand what the Court means 
by "intentional conduct." 
a. Shootings During Investigations 
In the first situation, officers draw their weapons while investigating 
suspicious activity. As they approach the suspects with drawn guns, the 
suspects do not respond to this assertion of authority either because they 
do not see the guns or because they choose to ignore the officers' re-
quests. 159 The suspects eventually stop because police officers "acciden-
tally" discharge their drawn guns, hitting or killing the suspects. 160 
In analyzing this situation, courts have reached conflicting conclu-
sions as to whether the suspects were "seized" within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. 161 Those courts that have found that there was no 
"seizure" have described the shooting as an accident. 162 In contrast, 
some courts have found that this type of shooting is a Fourth Amend-
ment "seizure" by implicitly recognizing the seriousness of drawing a 
gun. 163 They have proceeded to analyze whether the drawing of the gun 
was reasonable under the circumstances. By examining some of these 
conflicting cases in light of the Court's three "seizure" definitions, one 
can discern the bases for the confusion and the need for the Supreme 
Court to declare that the Fourth Amendment is implicated when police 
officers withdraw their weapons during an investigation or an arrest. 
One federal district court refused to find the Fourth Amendment 
applicable to a shooting because the shooting "was not a volitional 
act."164 In Matthews v. City of Atlanta, 165 which was decided before 
Brower v. County of lnyo, 166 a police officer suspected that two men were 
about to leave the parking lot in a stolen truck. 167 With his gun drawn, 
158. See infra text accompanying notes 215-58. 
159. See infra text accompanying notes 159-214. 
160. See infra text accompanying notes 159-214. 
161. Compare Glasco v. Ballard, 768 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E.D. Va. 1991) ("a wholly acci-
dental shooting is not a 'seizure' ") and Matthews v. City of Atlanta, 699 F. Supp. 1552, 1557 
(N.D. Ga. 1988) (no seizure because shooting was "not a volitional act") with Pleasant v. 
Zamieski, 895 F.2d 272, 276 (6th Cir. 1990) (court analyzes both the withdrawal of gun and 
failure to reholster to determine if conduct was "reasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 144 (1990). 
162. See infra text accompanying notes 164-92. 
163. See infra text accompanying notes 193-214. 
164. Matthews v. City of Atlanta, 699 F. Supp. 1552, 1557 (N.D. Ga. 1988) 
165. Id. at 1552. 
166. 489 U.S. 593 (1989); see supra text accompanying notes 77-92 for a discussion of this 
case. 
167. Matthews, 699 F. Supp. at 1553. 
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the police officer ordered the driver to "disengage the engine."168 The 
officer then placed his gun at or near the driver's head and ordered him 
and his passenger to exit the truck. 169 When the driver failed to comply 
with the officer's demand, the officer reached into the truck to disengage 
the engine.170 The truck suddenly "lurched forward," hitting either the 
officer's hand or weapon.171 The gun then discharged into the driver's 
head, killing him. 172 
After considering these facts, the federal district court determined 
that no "seizure" occurred.173 Its conclusion, however, was not based on 
any of the Supreme Court's seizure definitions. It instead focused on the 
lack of intent to fire the gun, not the intentional act of drawing the gun 
and pointing it at the suspect's head. 174 Even though the court recog-
nized that "under the proper facts" the drawing of a gun and its firing 
could both be Fourth Amendment seizuresP5 it balanced the parties' 
interests and determined that the drawing of a gun generally does not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment.176 It declared that officers may draw 
their guns even if they would not be justified in firing them. 177 The dis-
trict court implicitly based this bright-line rule on the theory of time 
reaction: officers must have their guns ready for use because suspects can 
injure or kill them faster than they can react. 178 
Another federal district court has also found support for a similar 
conclusion by applying the Supreme Court's "seizure" definition from 
Brower v. County of In yo. In Glasco v. Ballard, 119 a federal district court 
stated, "[A] wholly accidental shooting is not a 'seizure' within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment."180 In that case, a police officer 
drove alongside two men who were walking. 181 He thought he noticed in 
one of the men's pockets objects stolen from a convenience store.182 
While in his car, the officer asked the man what was in his pocket.183 
168. Id. 
169. Jd. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 1553-54. 
173. 699 F. Supp. at 1557. 
174. Id. 
175. Jd. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Jd. 
179. 768 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Va. 1991). 
180. Jd. at 180. 
181. Id. at 177. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
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When the officer could not understand the man's response, he got out of 
his cruiser and withdrew his gun. 184 The cruiser, however, rolled for-
ward. 185 The officer in attempting to stop the car lost control of his gun, 
which discharged and hit one of the suspects in the neck. 186 
In applying the Brower definition, the court interpreted the Supreme 
Court's definition to focus on the intent to harm the suspect, not the 
means used to stop the suspect. 187 The court stated that under Brower, 
"it is still relevant whether the officer intended to perform the underlying 
violent act at all."188 The court refused to analyze whether the drawing 
of the gun was a Fourth Amendment "seizure."189 Under its narrow 
interpretation of Brower, the district court focused only on the firing of 
the gun. In addition, it interpreted what constitutes a Fourth Amend-
ment "seizure" by attempting to define the line between an ordinary state 
tort and a Fourth Amendment violation. 190 The court stated that if an 
accident were a Fourth Amendment "seizure," then police officers would 
automatically be liable under the Fourth Amendment for negligent con-
duct.191 It determined that more than negligent conduct was necessary 
to violate the Fourth Amendment. 192 The court thus limited the reach of 
the Fourth Amendment by focusing only on the act of shooting, an "ac-
cident," and not the intentional act of withdrawing a gun. 
Others courts, however, both before and after Brower, have not in-
terpreted the Fourth Amendment so narrowly. They have focussed on 
whether there was an objective intent to stop the individual and whether 
the drawing of the gun was reasonable under the circumstances. In 
Pleasant v. Zamieski, 193 a police officer was investigating an alleged theft 
of an automobile. 194 He approached the driver, identified himself, 
"showed" the driver his gun, and commanded the driver to get out of the 
car. 195 The driver, who initially refused to leave the car, got out and 
began to climb a fence. 196 As the officer grabbed the driver, the gun 
"accidentally discharged" into the suspect's back, killing him. 197 
184. 768 F. Supp. at 177. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 179. 
188. 768 F. Supp. at 179. 
189. Id. at 179-80. 
190. Id. at 180. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. 895 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 144 (1990). 
194. Id. at 273. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
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In addressing the Fourth Amendment claim, the Sixth Circuit in 
Pleasant determined that the Fourth Amendment was applicable to two 
claims: the officer's intentional decision to draw his gun and the officer's 
failure to reholster the gun as the driver tried to escape.198 The court 
interpreted Brower to question whether the gun was the instrumentality 
used to effectuate a stop. 199 It explained that whether the officer had 
acted properly in drawing the gun was a question relating to the second 
issue in Fourth Amendment cases, whether the officer's conduct was ob-
jectively reasonable.200 It stated, "[t]he inquiry as to whether or not 
some action constitutes a 'seizure' under the Fourth Amendment is dis-
tinct from the inquiry as to whether an action already found to constitute 
a Fourth Amendment seizure is also 'unreasonable' under the Fourth 
Amendment. "201 The court thus found that the suspect had been 
seized. 202 It used the circumstances surrounding the shooting incident as 
facts to consider in determining whether the officer acted reasonably.2°3 
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Jenkins v. Aver-
ett204 evaluated an officer's conduct prior to a shooting to determine 
whether it was reasonable.205 Like the Pleasant court, it did not find 
controlling the officer's assertion that the firing was an accident.206 In 
Jenkins, a police officer chased a youth who fled upon the sight of seeing 
a police car. 207 Mter using the cruiser to chase the youth, the officer got 
out of the car, "drew and cocked his pistol, and then chased his quarry 
about 60 feet."208 When the officer yelled "halt," the youth stopped.2°9 
A few seconds later, the officer's gun "accidentally" discharged.210 
The court determined that the Fourth Amendment was applicable 
to this shooting by relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. 
Ohio.211 As Terry explained, the "right of personal security belongs as 
much to the citizen on the street of our cities as to the homeowner clos-
eted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs."212 It stated that the 
198. 895 F.2d at 276-77. 
199. Id. at 277 (interpreting Brower v. County of Inyo, 109 S. Ct. 1378 (1989)). 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 276-77. 
204. 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970). 
205. Id. at 1232. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 1230. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. 424 F.2d at 1232; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968). 
212. Id. at 1232 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 1, 8-9 (1968)). 
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word "accident" was not a talisman for releasing the officer from liabil-
ity.213 The shooting was only an accident in the sense that the harm was 
not "specifically intended."214 It declared that the Fourth Amendment 
was applicable because the officer acted wantonly in shooting the sus-
pect.215 It did not determine that the Fourth Amendment was applicable 
because the suspect had stopped in compliance with the officer's show of 
authority. Under these facts, however, the conduct would also signify a 
"seizure" under both prongs of the Hodari D. "seizure" definition re-
gardless of the time frame used. 216 When the suspect stopped in compli-
ance with the officer's command to halt, the officer "seized" him. When 
the officer shot him, thus using physical force, he also "seized" him. 
Under both the Terry and Hodari D. definitions of "seizure" a seizure 
occurred. 
The conflicts in analyzing shootings that occur during investigations 
thus arise from whether courts evaluate the officer's conduct prior to the 
shooting or just the shooting itself. They also arise from different inter-
pretations of Brower, with some courts requiring an intent to harm and 
others requiring an intent to stop. 
b. Shootings After a Seizure Has Occurred 
Other issues surface when analyzing a shooting that follows a 
Fourth Amendment seizure. In contrast to shootings occurring during 
investigations, the Fourth Amendment is always implicated when the 
suspect stops in compliance with the officer's show of authority.217 The 
question in this situation is how to analyze a shooting that follows a 
Fourth Amendment "seizure." Similar to the decisions addressing "acci-
dental" shootings during investigations, some courts have considered 
only the conduct of the shooting itself, even though the shootings oc-
curred after a Fourth Amendment "seizure."218 They have failed to find 
the Fourth Amendment implicated because the shooting was an "acci-
dent."219 In contrast, other courts have focused on the act of drawing a 
weapon and analyzed whether this act was reasonable within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Am.endment.22° Few courts, however, have discussed 
whether the prior Fourth Amendment seizure supports a determination 
213. Id. at 1232. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991). 
217. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1550 (1991). 
218. See infra text accompanying notes 220-42. 
219. See infra text accompanying notes 202-24. 
220. See infra text accompanying notes 243-58. 
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that the post-seizure shooting implicated the Fourth Amendment. 221 In 
this context, a question emerges as to whether the Fourth Amendment 
applies to post-seizure conduct by police officers. 222 
In a decision decided before Brower, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals223 declared that the Fourth Amendment applies to shootings 
designed for "the purpose of seizing" the suspect, not accidents that hap-
pen after the suspect has stopped.224 In Dodd, a police officer had 
stopped a burglary suspect. 225 With his weapon drawn, the officer placed 
one handcuff on the suspect who was lying on the ground after falling 
through a window.226 As the officer attempted to put the other handcuff 
on, the suspect reached for the officer's gun. 227 As the officer attempted 
to keep his gun from the suspect, it "accidentally" discharged, killing the 
suspect.228 The court determined that the Fourth Amendment did not 
221. See, e.g., Loria v. Town of Irondequoit, 775 F. Supp. 599, 604 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(court distinguishes cases in which a Fourth Amendment "seizure" occurred before the shoot-
ing); Estate of Jackson v. City of Rochester, 705 F. Supp. 779, 786 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) ("the 
shooting was unrelated to the stop"; officer "did not shoot [the suspect] for the purpose of 
seizing him"); see generally Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194-95 (7th Cir. 1989) (the court 
rejects the concept of a continuing "seizure" because "it could lead to an unwarranted expan-
sion of constitutional law; the court, however, determines that a suspect had stated a claim 
under the fourteenth amendment, which requires the suspect to prove conduct that "shocks 
the conscience"; the court refuses to label this deprivation of "liberty" a claim of "substantive 
due process," even though most courts do) (cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1026) (1990)). 
222. Two recent Supreme Court cases support analysis of this latter issue. In Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to 
"all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the 
course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen .... " Id. at 395 
(emphasis in original). Although it explained that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to ex-
cessive force claims asserted by pretrial detainees, it did not explain which amendment applies 
to force used after a Fourth Amendment "seizure." Id. at 395 n.lO. In addition, in California 
v. Hodari, Ill S. Ct. 1547 (1991), the Supreme Court implied that a scenario could result in 
multiple seizures if the suspect escaped after the initial seizure. Id. at 1550. It cited an 1874 
case for the proposition that a" 'seizure is a single act, and not a continuous fact.'" I d. (citing 
Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 411 (1874)). When read together, these cases 
could suggest that "the course of an arrest" or an "investigation" could result in multiple 
claims under the Fourth Amendment if each aspect of the challenged conduct constitutes a 
Fourth Amendment "seizure.'' They also, however, support applying the Fourth Amendment 
to a post-seizure shooting because during the investigation or arrest the officer has maintained 
control over the suspect. In this context, one could interpret the conduct as a "continuing 
arrest.'' Analysis of some of these situations reveals the difficulties of applying the Court's 
"seizure" definitions. 
223. Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1007 
(1988). 
224. Dodd, 827 F.2d at 7. 
225. Id. at 2-3. 
226. Id. at 3. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
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apply because "[t]he shooting was a pure accident."229 
When the Second Circuit decided what constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment "seizure," it did not cite the Terry or Mendenhall defini-
tions. The Second Circuit instead relied on the Supreme Court's decision 
in Tennessee v. Garner, 230 in which the officer intentionally killed the 
fleeing suspect in order to stop him.231 The Second Circuit stated that 
the Garner decision clearly indicated that intentional conduct was neces-
sary to effectuate a Fourth Amendment "seizure."232 The court thus 
found that there was no "seizure" in this case because the shooting was 
not intentional and because it was not done "for the purpose of seizing" 
the suspect. 233 In addition to its interpretation of Garner, the court also 
maintained that negligent conduct during an arrest is not actionable 
under the Fourth Amendment.234 
After the Court's decision in Brower, other courts have similarly an-
alyzed post-seizure shootings. A federal district court in Troublefield v. 
City of Harrisburg235 determined that post-seizure shootings should be 
evaluated in the same manner as shootings during the course of an inves-
tigation. 236 In Troublefield, a police officer suspected a driver in a parked 
car of automobile theft. 237 The officer withdrew his weapon, approached 
the car, and asked the driver if he owned the car.238 When the driver 
admitted that he did not, the officer ordered him to get out of the car and 
lie on the ground.239 The officer then handcuffed the suspect.240 As he 
returned his gun to his holster, it accidentally discharged into the driver's 
leg_241 
The federal court interpreted the Brower "seizure" definition to re-
quire an intent to stop a suspect by shooting him. 242 Because the suspect 
had already been stopped, there was no intent to stop the suspect by 
229. Id. at 7. 
230. 471 U.S. 1 (1985); see supra text accompanying notes 125-30 for a discussion of this 
case. 
231. Id. at 7-22. 
232. Dodd, 827 F.2d at 7. 
233. Id. 
234. I d. at 7-8; see also Miller v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 569 So. 2d 1386, 1387 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1990) (negligent shooting not actionable); but see Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 
1384, 1391 (9th Cir. 1988) (negligence may be actionable under Fourth Amendment). 
235. 789 F. Supp. 160 (M.D. Pa. 1992). 
236. Id. at 166. 
237. Id. at 162. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. 
241. 789 F. Supp. at 162. 
242. Id. at 165-66. 
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using a gun.243 It refused to scrutinize whether the officer was negligent 
in "pulling out a firearm or in reholstering it" because it found that negli-
gence does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation under the 
Fourth Amendment.244 It did, however, state that the Fourth Amend-
ment would be implicated if an officer intended to shoot a suspect who 
had already stopped. 245 The court explained that a shooting under those 
circumstances would constitute a "second seizure."246 
In contrast to the extremely narrow viewpoints expressed in 
Troublefield and Dodd, other courts have determined that similar post-
seizure shootings implicate the Fourth Amendment. 247 They have ques-
tioned whether the act of withdrawing a gun was reasonable within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. They have interpreted the Fourth 
Amendment to require courts to evaluate the circumstances to determine 
whether the use of a gun was reasonable. 
In Leber v. Smith, 248 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized 
that a driver who was stopped by a roadblock was "seized"249 under the 
Court's definition in Mendenhall, which stated that a "seizure" occurs 
when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. 250 The Sixth Cir-
cuit appeared to automatically subject the police officer's conduct follow-
ing the seizure to scrutiny under the reasonableness standard of the 
Fourth Amendment. It evaluated whether the officer acted reasonably in 
approaching the stopped driver with his gun drawn.251 Even though 
both parties agreed that the gun accidentally discharged when the officer 
slipped on some ice, the court nevertheless required the officer to provide 
reasons for approaching the suspect with a gun. 252 
The seriousness of drawing a gun was also considered by a federal 
court in Patterson v. Fuller. 253 In this case, an officer had a suspect lie on 
the floor near a companion.254 As the officer stood at the suspect's head, 
243. /d. at 166. The court stated, "as [the driver] was injured by a bullet fired by accident, 
no Fourth Amendment rights have been trampled upon because [the officer] did not intend the 
bullet to bring [the driver] within his control or to, perhaps, settle him down were be strug-
gling to break free." Id. 
244. Id. at 166. 
245. Id. at 166. 
246. ld. 
247. See infra text accompanying notes 244-58. 
248. 773 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 1084 (1986). 
249. Leber, 113 F.2d at 105. 
250. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 908 
(1980). 
251. Leber, 713 F.2d at 105. 
252. Id. 
253. 654 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Ga. 1987). 
254. Id. at 420. 
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another officer had a shotgun to maintain control. 255 When the suspect 
moved his hand, the officer stepped back and tripped on an ashtray.256 
His cocked gun accidentally discharged, killing the suspect. 257 Instead of 
· characterizing the shooting as an "accident," the court determined that 
the shooting constituted a "seizure. "258 
Even though the Second Circuit in Dodd had interpreted the Garner 
decision to require an intentional shooting, the federal district court 
noted that all nine justices in Garner had agreed "that apprehension by 
the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness require-
ment of the Fourth Amendment."259 Although the Patterson court rec-
ognized the ambiguity associated with the Mendenhall definition, the 
court thought that it was obvious that killing someone constituted a 
Fourth Amendment "seizure."260 It also determined that negligence was 
actionable under the Fourth Amendment. 261 Liability would attach if a 
jury determined that the officer was negligent in standing with a cocked 
gun over the head of the suspect. 262 The court thus focused on the of-
ficer's conduct that preceded the shooting. 
The cases thus reveal the different approaches the circuits have 
taken in defining what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure" when 
guns "accidentally" discharge during an investigation or after a seizure. 
One disagreement arises from how courts view the act of drawing a gun: 
some courts refuse to evaluate the reasonableness of this act and others 
focus on it. Courts also disagree on whether negligence is actionable. 
These conflicts implicitly reflect different views of the authority that the 
Fourth Amendment affords courts to evaluate each action taken by po-
lice officers during their investigations and arrests. 
4. "Accidental" Injuries to Known and Unknown Bystanders 
Because all three "seizure" definitions arose in situations in which 
the use of physical force or the "show of authority" was directed at the 
suspect, most courts have applied the Fourth Amendment only to the 
relationship between the police officer and the suspect, not the officer and 
injured bystanders. 263 Some courts, however, have applied the Fourth 
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. 654 F. Supp. at 426. 
259. Id. at 426 (quoting Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985)). 
260. Id. at 426. 
261. Id. at 427. 
262. Id. 
263. See infra text accompanying notes 261-70, 275-88. 
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Amendment to claims arising from injuries to bystanders if police officers 
knew or should have known of their presence when they decided to use 
physical force to stop a suspect. 26:'1- An examination of some of these con-
flicting decisions also reveals the problems in understanding the scope of 
the Court's "seizure" definitions. 
Courts have disagreed as to how to apply the Court's "seizure" defi-
nitions to situations in which police officers "accidentally" injure known 
bystanders as they use physical force to apprehend a suspect. In Landol-
Rivera v. Cruz Cosme,265 the First Circuit Court of Appeals very nar-
rowly interpreted the Brower decision by not applying the tort doctrine of 
"transferred intent"266 to a shooting. 267 In that case, police officers were 
attempting to stop a driver who had just used a gun to rob a store and 
who had taken a hostage into an automobile.268 As the driver, who had 
the hostage on his lap, tried to drive away, a police officer shot at the 
driver, but hit the hostage instead, causing serious injury.269 
The First Circuit rejected the hostage's Fourth Amendment claim 
by holding that the officer had not seized him by the shooting. 270 It re-
fused to define "intent" in terms of the "deliberateness with which a 
given action is taken."271 It stated that Brower required "police action 
directed toward producing a particular result."272 Under this interpreta-
tion of Brower, the court determined that the shooting was not directed 
at stopping the hostage, but rather at stopping the suspect. 273 A 
"seizure" would have occurred only if the bullet had hit its desired ob-
ject, the driver. The doctrine of "transferred intent," however, indicates 
that intent travels with the bullet: if a police officer intended to wound 
the suspect, but "accidentally" hits the hostage, the officer has acted "in-
264. See infra text accompanying notes 270-74. 
265. 906 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1990). 
266. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 8, at 37-39 (5th ed. 1984) (under this doctrine if one intends to harm a person, but the act 
unforeseeably results in injury to another, the injury is nevertheless deemed intentional). 
267. 906 F.2d at 794-96. 
268. Id. at 791-92. 
269. Id. at 792. 
270. Id. at 795. 
271. I d. 
272. I d. 
273. Id. at 795. The court stated, "no Fourth Amendment seizure occurred here because 
[the hostage] was not the object of the police bullet that struck him." I d. Another judge has 
suggested that this narrow interpretation of a Fourth Amendment "seizure" is proper. See 
Adams v. St. Luckie County Sheriff's Dept., 962 F.2d 1563, 1574 (11th Cir. 1992) (Edmonson, 
J., dissenting) (known passenger in vehicle may not have been "seized" by a police cruiser, 
which rammed the vehicle because he was not the "object" of the seizure). 
Winter 1993] SHOOTINGS AS FOURTH AMENDMENT SEIZURES 369 
tentionally" in wounding the hostage. 274 If courts were to apply this tort 
doctrine to the issue of interpreting what constitutes a Fourth Amend-
ment "seizure," they would determine that a "seizure" occurred and 
then proceed to determine if the "seizure" was reasonable within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Application of this tort doctrine 
would thus sometimes afford innocent bystanders with a civil remedy in 
damages. In contrast to suspects who may at times be able to suppress 
evidence as a result of an unlawful "seizure," innocent bystanders only 
remedy against reckless shootings is one in damages for a violation of a 
constitutional right. 
Other courts, however, have found Fourth Amendment "seizures" 
under similar circumstances, without having to invoke the doctrine of 
transferred intent. In examining the use of physical force to stop a vehi-
cle containing a suspect and passenger, some courts have found that of-
ficers have "seized" every person in the vehicle. 275 In Keller v. Frink, 216 
a federal district court interpreted the Brower definition more broadly 
than the First Circuit. It determined that if an officer intended to stop a 
car by shooting at it and the car stops, then the officer has "seized" every 
person in the vehicle.277 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held that when a 
police officer stopped a driver by using a roadblock, the officer had also 
"seized" the passenger, whom the officer knew was present.278 In that 
case, the Fifth Circuit suggested that an officer's knowledge of a passen-
ger's presence may be relevant to determining whether a "seizure" oc-
curred. In the context of shooting at vehicles or stopping them by a 
roadblock, the courts thus disagree whether police officers seize passen-
gers when their objective intent is to stop the driver. This conflict is 
possible because there are different interpretations of what the Brower 
seizure definition meant by "intentional conduct." Some courts require 
an objective intent to stop a particular individual, and others require an 
objective intent to use means which results in a stop, whether of a known 
or unknown person. 
In other situations, courts have also failed to find that known by-
standers were "seized" because of their interpretation of "intentional" 
conduct. In Frye v. Town of Akron, 219 a federal district court determined 
274. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 262 § 8, at 37-39. 
275. See, e.g., Adams v. St. Lucie County Sheriff's Dept., 962 F.2d 1563, 1570 (11th Cir. 
1992) ("intentional successful use of physical force applied directly to an automobile in order 
to apprehend its occupants implicates the Fourth Amendment and constitutes a seizure"). 
276. 745 F. Supp. 1428 (S.D. Ind. 1990). 
277. /d. at 1432. 
278. Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1210 (5th Cir. 1985). 
279. 759 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Ind. 1991). 
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that a police officer who crashed into the pursued motorcyclist and his 
passenger did not "seize" the passenger.280 The court stated that no 
"seizure" occurred because under Brower the officer had not "intended" 
to cause a stop by crashing into the motorcycle.281 In contrast, the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Roach v. City of Fredericktown282 
evaluated under the Fourth Amendment the claim asserted by a motorist 
who was injured when a pursued driver crashed into him. 283 The court 
applied the Fourth Amendment because the injury to the innocent mo-
torist had occurred during the pursuit.Z84 It interpreted the Court's deci-
sion in Graham v. Connor85 to apply to this claim because it had arisen 
"in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop."286 After determining 
that the Fourth Amendment was implicated, it determined that the of-
ficer did not violate the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment 
in conducting a high-speed pursuit of a stolen automobile.287 
Even though the federal courts disagree as to when a known by-
stander is "seized" by the application of physical force, most courts do 
not find the Fourth Amendment applicable when unknown bystanders 
are injured during an investigation.288 To illustrate, the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Rucker v. Harford County289 held that a bystander 
whom the officers reasonably believed had left the scene of a confronta-
tion was not "seized" when a stray bullet hit him.290 The court noted 
that officers had told the bystander to leave, that the bystander had the 
opportunity to leave, and that the bystander should have willingly left 
because the confrontation between the suspect and the officers presented 
"visible danger."291 In finding no seizure, the court interpreted the 
Brower definition and declared that absent intent (either to harm or to 
stop) the "shooting was purely accidental" and therefore failed to invoke 
280. Id. at 1323. 
281. /d. 
282. 882 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1989). 
283. Id. at 297. 
284. /d. 
285. 490 u.s. 386 (1989). 
286. Roach, 882 F.2d at 297. 
287. /d. 
288. See, e.g., Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1495 n.3 (lOth Cir. 
1992) (Fourth Amendment not applicable to driver who was injured by the vehicle of a fleeing 
suspect). Many courts, however, have considered the claims of injured third parties under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., id. at 1496 (collecting 
cases). 
289. 946 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1991). 
290. Id. at 281. 
291. Id. at 281-82. 
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the Fourth Amendment. 292 
In determining whether police officers have seized known and un-
known bystanders by injuring them, courts have thus applied some of the 
same contrasting viewpoints as expressed when analyzing injuries to sus-
pects. They have disagreed as to whether conduct they label an "acci-
dent" can constitute a seizure, regardless of whether the injured person 
was a suspect or a bystander. They have also interpreted Brower differ-
ently, with some courts requiring an intent to harm and others requiring 
an intent to stop. 
Courts considering the claims of bystanders, similar to courts evalu-
ating the claims of injured suspects, attempt to define the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment. In doing so, they also frequently discuss the rela-
tionship of the Fourth Amendment with the substantive due process 
component of the Fourteenth Amendment. 293 Courts have disagreed as 
to whether the Fourth Amendment is the only ground on which injured 
individuals may properly assert a basis of recovery. 294 An examination 
of this conflicts reveals the contrasting viewpoints of the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
ill. "Accidental" Shooting Claims Under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendements 
In analyzing shootings by police officers, lower courts have not only 
had different interpretations of the Court's three "seizure" definitions in 
Terry, Mendenhall, and Brower, they have also disagreed as to whether 
shootings that did not constitute Fourth Amendment "seizures" are nev-
ertheless actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 295 Some courts 
have determined that accidental shootings may be actionable under the 
substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment, 296 
and others have determined that accidental shootings that occur during 
an investigation or an arrest may be actionable only under the Fourth 
Amendment.297 At the core of this conflict is the role of the Fourth 
292. Id. 
293. See infra text accompanying notes 292-93, 305. 
294. See infra text accompanying note 293. 
295. See infra text accompanying notes 292-93. 
296. See, e.g., Rucker v. Hartford County, 946 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 1175 (1992); Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 796 (1st Cir. 1990); 
Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1988); Fcye v. Town of 
Akron, 759 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Ind. 1991); Palmer v. Williamson, 717 F. Supp. 1218, 
1223 (W.D. Tex. 1989); Estate of Jackson v. City of Rochester, 705 F. Supp. 779, 785 
(W.D.N.Y. 1989); Patterson v. Fuller, 654 F. Supp. 418, 425 (N.D. Ga. 1987). 
297. See, e.g., Troublefield v. City of Harrisburg, 789 F. Supp. 160, 166-67 (M.D. Pa. 
1992); Montgomecy v. County of Clinton, 743 F. Supp. 1253, 1255-56 (W.D. Mich. 1990), 
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Amendment: whether it protects individuals from reckless or grossly 
negligent police shootings and whether it protects individuals who are 
injured during the detention immediately following their arrest. Recent 
Supreme Court decisions support the view that the Fourth Amendment 
is the proper amendment under which to analyze shootings by police 
officers. 
In 1989, the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor298 attempted to 
clarify the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and the substan-
tive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment and its appli-
cations to police shootings. 299 When analyzing excessive force claims, 
the Court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to "seized'' suspects, 
and the Fourteenth Amendment applies to "pretrial detainees," classifi-
cations, however, not clearly defined by the Court. 300 The Supreme 
Court held that conduct that is actionable under the Fourth Amendment 
is not actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 301 It determined 
that the Fourth Amendment was the sole amendment for alleging that 
police officers used unreasonable force during a seizure because the 
Amendment "provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protec-
tion against ... physically intrusive governmental conduct ... .''302 The 
Court did not, however, expound upon what constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment "seizure." It merely reiterated in a footnote the Terry defi-
nition and cited the Brower definition. 303 It identified classic situations 
involving Fourth Amendment "seizures": an arrest and an investigative 
stop. 304 The Court did, however, also state that the Fourth Amendment 
applies to "other 'seizure[s]' of a free citizen."305 
affd mem., 940 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1991); McKenzie v. City of Milpitas, 738 F. Supp. 1293, 
1299 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1990) affd mem., 953 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1992). 
298. 490 u.s. 386 (1989). 
299. Jd. at 394-95. Prior to and after the Court's decision in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 
1 (1985), lower courts applied different standards for determining whether officials had used 
excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See e.g., Kathryn R. Urbonya, The 
Constitutionality of High-speed pursuits under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, 35 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 205, 209-11 (1991). 
300. 490 U.S. at 395 n.IO. 
301. Id. at 395. 
302. I d. 
303. Id. at 395 n.10. 
304. Jd. at 395. 
305. See, e.g., McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292, 293-94 (7th Cir. 1992) (child was 
"seized" by officer's pointing of a gun at his head during the execution of a search warrant, 
even though the child was not a suspect or interfering with the search); see also Michigan 
Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990) (stop of a driver at a roadblock for 
inspection of signs of intoxication). 
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The Graham Court, however, did leave open an important question 
that directly relates to the scope of the Fourth Amendment. It recog-
nized that it has not resolved the issue of whether the Fourth Amend-
ment applies "beyond the point at which [an] arrest ends and pretrial 
detention begins."306 
Despite the Graham Court's demarcation between the proper appli-
cation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court in 
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin 301 never discussed applying the Four-
teenth Amendment to the issue of how long the government may detain 
suspects without a probable cause determination. In Riverside, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment to apply to claims 
that governmental officials had failed to provide timely probable cause 
determinations for suspects who had been detained for days. 308 Even 
though one could easily classify the plaintiffs as "pretrial detainees," the 
Court did not evaluate these claims under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 309 The Fourth Amendment was the proper amendment for their 
protection because the Court had previously applied it when determining 
the type of a probable cause hearing necessary.310 In short, the Fourth 
Amendment guided the Court in determining not only what type of 
probable cause hearings suspects are to receive, but also when they are to 
receive them. 311 
306. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.lO. This unresolved question, however, is an issue related 
to shootings after a "seizure" has occurred. See supra text accompanying notes 213-56. 
307. 111 s. Ct. 1661 (1991). 
308. /d. at 1667-71. 
309. /d. at 1665, 1667-71. 
310. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (after a warrantless arrest, a prompt 
hearing to determine probable cause is necessary under the Fourth Amendment under some 
circumstances). 
311. County of Riverside, Ill S. Ct. at 1670. The Court created a three-part standard for 
determining when a hearing was prompt: (1) a hearing within forty-eight hours is generally 
permissible, (2) a hearing within forty-eight hours may nevertheless violate the Fourth 
Amendment if the delay was caused by a need to gather evidence, ill will, or "delay for delay's 
sake," and (3) a hearing after forty-eight hours may nevertheless be prompt if the government 
can establish that "extraordinary circumstances" caused the delay. /d. 
This application of the Fourth Amendment to post-seizure conduct is consistent with the 
lower federal courts' trend to extend the scope of the Fourth Amendment beyond an arrest. 
See, e.g., Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1160 (lOth Cir. 1991) (Fourth Amendment ap-
plies to "treatment of the arrestee detained without a warrant"); Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 
842, 845 (9th Cir. 1991) (en bane) (Fourth Amendment applies to force used in administering 
a blood test at the hospital after the plaintiff was arrested), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 582 (1991); 
Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) (Fourth Amendment applies to force 
used prior to time plaintiff was arraigned or formally charged); Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 
F.2d 706, 713 n.7 (7th Cir. 1987) (Fourth Amendment applies to force used before booking 
and the setting of bail); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1384 n.3 (4th Cir. 1987) (Fourth 
Amendment applies to force used in "effecting and maintaining arrests"), cert. denied, 484 
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In addition, the Supreme Court in California v. Hodari D. 312 sug-
gested that the Fourth Amendment may apply to the conduct of police 
officers after they effectuate a Fourth Amendment "seizure."313 The 
Court briefly mentioned the concepts of a "continuing arrest" and of 
multiple "seizures."314 It explained that if an officer used physical force 
to stop a suspect, an arrest might have occurred, but if the suspect es-
caped then there would not be a "continuing arrest.'ms Application of 
these concepts to a situation in which officers maintain control over a 
suspect might suggest that there is a "continuing arrest" and the Fourth 
Amendment applies to conduct until the suspect becomes a pretrial 
detainee. 316 
Although these Supreme Court decisions suggest a broad applica-
tion of the Fourth Amendment to conduct by police officers, the Four-
teenth Amendment nevertheless re-emerged as a ground for excessive 
force claims after the Court's decision in Brower v. County of In yo. 317 In 
Brower, the Court significantly narrowed the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment by interpreting the word "seizure" to signify "intentional" 
conduct.318 The question arose as to how to evaluate less culpable con-
duct, that is, conduct that was reckless or grossly negligent. 
U.S. 1027 (1988); Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985) (Fourth Amendment 
applies while arrestee was "in the custody of the arresting officers"); but see Titran v. Ackman, 
893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990) (Fourteenth Amendment, not Fourth Amendment, applies 
to force used after the booking process). 
312. 111 s. Ct. 1547 (1991). 
313. /d. at 1550. 
314. Id. 
315. Id. 
316. In addition, the Court was willing to protect the right to personal security by labeling 
"touching" a Fourth Amendment "seizure." Id. Under this view, the Fourth Amendment 
would permit citizens to bring multiple claims under the Fourth Amendment for each applica-
tion of physical force that was "unreasonable." 
The concepts of multiple seizures and a continuing arrest, however, do not clarify the 
scope of the Fourth Amendment because the concepts are subject to conflicting interpreta-
tions. For example, some courts have interpreted the Fourth Amendment to apply to multiple 
claims only if each event would constitute an independent seizure. See, e.g., Wilkins v. May, 
872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989) (court rejected concept of a "continuing seizure" under the 
Fourth Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment applied to the officers' pointing of a gun at a 
suspect's head during custodial interrogation), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1026 (1990); see also 
supra text accompanying notes 169-72. On the other hand, some courts have interpreted the 
Fourth Amendment to apply not only to a single seizure but also to all conduct after the 
seizure to determine if the conduct was "reasonable." See supra notes 271-74 and accompany-
ing text. 
317. 489 U.S. 593 (1989). See supra text accompanying notes 77-92 for a discussion of this 
case. 
318. /d. at 596-97. 
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Some Supreme Court decisions suggested that such conduct could 
constitute a "constitutional tort" under the substantive due process com-
ponent of the Fourteenth Amendment and its applications to police 
shootings. The Supreme Court has repeated1y affirmed that the substan-
tive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
governmental officials from violating citizens' civil liberties. 319 In defin-
ing the scope of protected civil liberties, the Supreme Court in Daniels v. 
Williams320 and Davidson v. Cannon321 held that negligence was not ac-
tionable under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Daniels Court based its 
conclusion on its interpretation of the word "deprivation" in the Four-
teenth Amendment and its view of the history of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 322 The Court interpreted the word "deprivation" to signify an 
"abuse of power"323 and stated that the amendment was designed to "se-
cure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of govern-
ment. "324 In rejecting negligence as a basis for a Fourteenth 
Amendment claim, the Court distinguished a "constitutional tort" from 
a state tort. It recognized that the Constitution does not necessarily du-
plicate the tort remedy available under state law. It did not dictate that 
conduct actionable under tort law is not actionable under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It instead required more culpable conduct than negligence 
to state a violation of the substantive due process component of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Court explicitly left open the question whether 
gross negligence and recklessness would be actionable under the Four-
teenth Amendment. 325 
The Supreme Court also suggested in DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Department of Social Services that governmental officials could be 
liable under the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth 
Amendment for harm that they cause. 326 Although the DeShaney Court 
determined that there is no general duty to protect the public from harm 
caused by third parties, it did imply that when official actions makes citi-
319. See, e.g., Zinennon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) ("[T]he Due Process Clause 
contains a substantive [due process] component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful govern-
mental actions .... "); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
199-200 (1989) (officials have a constitutional duty to protect individuals in custody from 
harm); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986) (Although negligence is not actiona-
ble under the Fourteenth Amendment, gross negligence and recklessness may be.). 
320. 474 u.s. 327, 332-33. 
321. 474 u.s. 344, 348 (1986). 
322. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331. 
323. ld. at 330, 332. 
324. ld. at 326-27 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) (quoting Bank 
of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235, 244 (1819))). 
325. Id. at 334. 
326. 489 U.S. 189, 201 n.9 (1989). 
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zens "more vulnerable" to harm, then governmental officials may be lia-
ble for the harm that they themselves create. 327 
In recognizing substantive due process as a basis for infringements 
of the right to personal security, the Court thus clarified that both the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are possible sources for scrutiniz-
ing the conduct of officials. The Graham decision, however, expressed a 
preference for analyzing claims of "seized" individuals under the Fourth 
Amendment because it is an "explicit textual source ... of constitutional 
protection.'ms The Court labeled the Fourth Amendment as a "primary 
source of constitutional protection.''329 The Court's narrow interpreta-
tions of what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure," however, lim-
ited application of the Amendment. Although the amendment would 
seem to apply to most conduct between police officers and citizens be-
cause it addresses "unreasonable" conduct, the Court in Brower imposed 
a requirement that officers act intentionally in order to effectuate a 
seizure of a person. Courts that find reckless or grossly negligent shoot-
ing to constitute a "constitutional tort," however, have looked to the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a basis of recovery, even after the Court's 
decision in Graham. In contrast, those courts that believe that the 
Brower court struck the proper balance between a constitutional tort and 
an ordinary tort have refused to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to 
accidental shootings. 
Even though the task of distinguishing a constitutional tort from a 
state tort can be extraordinarily difficult, this task when placed in the 
context of police shootings is less complex. 
IV. Resuscitating the Terry Definition in the Context of 
Shootings by Police Officers 
The Fourth Amendment allows courts to scrutinize various police 
practices to determine whether they are "reasonable.''330 This authority 
is contingent upon whether the challenged conduct was also a "search" 
or "seizure.'' Articulating the boundaries of conduct that constitutes a 
Fourth Amendment "seizure" has been a difficult task for the Supreme 
Court as well as the lower courts. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has 
become so fact-specific that it is hard to know if a prior decision is prece-
327. Id. 
328. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 
329. Id. at 394. 
330. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (Court 
found reasonable under the Fourth Amendment the use of roadblocks to inspect drivers for 
signs of intoxication). 
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dent or totally irrelevant to a particular case. 331 In the context of police 
shootings, however, bright-lines are not only possible but desirable. Re-
suscitating the spirit of Terry v. Ohio would allow courts to scrutinize 
whether officers act reasonably when they use their guns as a "show of 
authority." The justification for application of this definition to police 
shooting lies in the Court's historic approach to balancing interests under 
the Fourth Amendment. Although the greatest defect of balancing is its 
unpredictable outcome, the Court's more recent justifications of reliance 
on the common law and dictionaries are similarly unpredictable. Balanc-
ing, however, has the added benefit of allowing courts to utilize policy to 
shape the contours of the Fourth Amendment. 
The task of defining what kind of conduct constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment "seizure" begins with the text of the Fourth Amendment. 
Textualism, however, "creates new problems of its own"332 because a 
text "is not self-interpreting."333 The Supreme Court, however, has em-
braced textualism as a method of limiting the application of various 
amendments, sometimes reaching peculiar conclusions. 334 
In defining what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure," the 
Court in California v. Hodari D. examined both old and modern diction-
aries. It summarized all the different uses of the word "seizure" in a 
331. In examining a variety of police practices, the Court has not clarified whether a partic-
ular seizure definition applies only to the facts of that case or is applicable in other contexts. 
Harmonizing the Supreme Court's seizure definitions is difficult. For example, in Hodari D. 
the Court in dicta suggested that "mere touching" could constitute a Fourth Amendment 
seizure, but in Brower v. County of Inyo, the Court suggested that the force must be used 
intentionally. Similarly, the Hodari Court did not seem to require that the officer require 
physical control over the suspect if officers used physical force, but the Brower Court based its 
physical force definition on the "acquisition of physical control." In addition, one never 
knows whether these definitions apply only to foot chases and roadblocks. 
332. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 7, at 53. 
333. Id. 
334. For example, the Court has studied the words "punishment" in the Eighth Amend-
ment, Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2325 (1991), "deprivation" in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 333-35 (1986), and "seizure" in the Fourth 
Amendment. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1550-51 (1991). The Court has pro-
claimed that the word "punishment" not only signifies "deliberate indifference" if the claim 
involved the serious medical needs of prisoners or prison conditions, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U.S. 97, 106 (1976), but also signifies "malicious" conduct if the claim is based on the use of 
excessive force by prison officials. Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 999 (1992). In inter-
preting the word "punishment," the Court failed to understand that it was merely interpreting 
the word from its own perspective. See generally Schanck, supra note 74, at 831 ("Judges will 
continue to interpret texts and will do so in accord with their deeply embedded assumptions, 
which include their commonly held jurisprudential and judicial interpretive constructs."). The 
Court nevertheless declared, "(t]he source of the intent requirement is not the predilections of 
this Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and unusual punishment." 
Seiter, Ill S. Ct. at 2325 (emphasis in original). 
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short phrase: the word means "taking possession."335 This definition, 
however, does not distinguish between the act of seizing an object from 
the act of seizing a person, a distinction that the Court had previously 
recognized. 336 The Court's reliance on dictionaries is misplaced because 
"the majestic generalities of the [F]ourth [A ]mendment itself suggest that 
the Framers were writing for the ages-that they were dealing with con-
cepts, not conceptions."337 For example, this general language has al-
lowed courts to scrutinize modem police practices of using airplanes, 338 
beepers, 339 drug tests, 340 electronic devices, 341 and helicopters342-prac-
tices not in existence at the time the Fourth Amendment was enacted. 343 
Complex legal issues arising under the Fourth Amendment thus should 
not be mechanically resolved by relying on a definition specified in a par-
ticular dictionary. 
Reliance on the common law as a means of interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment has also been an unsound guidepost for the Court. 344 In 
many situations the Court has adopted the common law in its interpreta-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, 345 other times it has rejected the com-
335. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1549 (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY 
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 67 (1828); 2 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICfiONARY 510 (6th ed. 
1856); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICfiONARY 2057 (1981)). 
336. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) ("some meaningful inter-
ference with an individual's possessory interestO"). 
337. Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 7, at 55 (citing R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY 134-36, 226 (1977)). Reliance on the language of the Fourth Amendment is also 
misplaced because "the actual language of the [F]ourth [A]mendment appears to have been the 
product of a back room maneuver that resulted in Congress' adoption of a provision that it had 
soundly defeated earlier and never consciously endorsed." Id. at 56-57 (citing NELSON B. 
LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 101-02 (1937)). 
338. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234-39 (1986) (aerial 
photography); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (aerial surveillance). 
339. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713-18 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 
460 U.S. 276, 282-85 (1983); see also Note, Mark C. Rohdert, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Pri-
vacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE L.J. 1461, 1461 (1977) ("The beeper is a miniature, 
battery-powered radio transmitter that emits recurrent signals at a set frequency."). 
340. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 
(1989) (drug tests); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 618-23 (1989) 
(drug and alcohol tests). 
341. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748-54 (1971) (radio transmitter); Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-59 (1967) (recording device). 
342. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-52 (1989). 
343. See generally Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 13 (1985) (quoting Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 n.33 (1980)) ("[The Court] 'has not simply frozen into constitutional 
law those law enforcement practices that existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment's 
passage.' "). 
344. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
345. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418-19 (1976) (common law on war-
rantless arrests); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111, 114 (1975) (detention without a 
warrant). 
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mon law because of technological changes, 346 and sometimes the Court 
explicitly adopted only limited aspects of the common law view for its 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 347 In California v. Hodari D., 
the Supreme Court both adopted and rejected common law views in de-
fining a Fourth Amendment "seizure." Under the common law a police 
officer may at times act unlawfully in merely touching suspects or at-
tempting to arrest them. In defining the scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the Court declared that a touching could constitute a Fourth 
Amendment "seizure," but that an attempted arrest was not a 
"seizure. "348 
Resolution of what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure" 
should lie ultimately in balancing, 349 not in the use of dictionaries and 
selective application of the common law. The Terry Court recognized 
that the amendment was designed for courts to strike a balance between 
the government's interest in law enforcement and a citizen's interest in 
personal security. In creating the concept of a Fourth Amendment 
"stop,'' the Court found no justification in the language of the Fourth 
Amendment. It instead balanced the need to recognize what most citi-
zens would find an acceptable police practice against an individual's in-
terest in personal security. For example, the language of the Fourth 
Amendment did not cause the Court to create a reasonable suspicion 
standard to justify a Fourth Amendment "stop." It also did not clearly 
indicate to the Court that the word "seizure" included both the concept 
of a stop and an arrest, but not an "encounter." The Court created these 
three categories as it balanced the intrusiveness of police practices against 
a citizen's freedom of movement. The Court evaluated numerous prac-
tices: asking a suspect to answer questions, 350 keeping a plane ticket from 
a boarding passenger,351 following a pedestrian in a car,352 and establish-
346. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 13 (1985) ("[R]eliance on the common law rule in 
this case [concerning a shooting] would be a mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes of a 
historical inquiry."). 
347. See California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1550-51 (1991). 
348. In adopting a portion of the common law, the Court stated that it was "expand[ing]" 
the meaning of a Fourth Amendment "seizure." /d. at 1550 n.2. The "expansion[,]" however, 
was limited only to the use of physical force, not to the assertion of authority. /d. at 1550. 
349. Professor Wayne LaFave recognized the importance of balancing when determining 
what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure." LaFave, supra note 28, at 742. He ex-
plained, "If not every ... intrusion constitutes a seizure, then certainly in making the policy 
judgment as to precisely where the constitutional line should be drawn, account may be taken 
of both (i) the degree of intrusiveness of a particular practice and (ii) the degree of public 
benefit if that practice is free of the usual Fourth Amendment restraints." /d. (emphasis in 
original). 
350. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554-55 (1980). 
351. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-501 (1983). 
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ing a roadblock.353 Narrow "seizure" definitions, derived from dictiona-
ries and selective application of the common law, however, preclude 
courts from analyzing modem police practices and the circumstances in 
which they occur. 
In the context of police shootings, a "show of authority," as first 
articulated by the Terry Court should be sufficient to implicate the 
Fourth Amendment because it represents a standard that properly recog-
nizes the need to subject police practices to scrutiny under the Fourth 
Amendment. To the extent that other "seizure" definitions conflict with 
the concept of a "show of authority," they should be limited to their 
specific facts, which is a common aspect of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence, or rejected as unsound. 
With Terry as the standard for analyzing police shooting, courts 
should also apply the Mendenhall definition and its progeny to the extent 
that they define what constitutes a Terry "show of authority." Because 
the Hodari D. decision did not interpret what constituted a "show of 
authority," courts should not apply it to police shootings. The Court's 
newly added restriction to the Mendenhall definition, compliance with 
the ''show of authority," would produce bizarre results in the context of 
police shootings. If courts were to apply the new restriction, the Fourth 
Amendment would not be implicated when police officers shoot their 
guns as long as they missed their targets. The risks associated with guns 
are too obvious to allow such a practice to evade constitutional scrutiny. 
The Brower354 definition also creates numerous problems when ap-
plied to police shootings. The greatest difficulty is the Brower require-
ment that a seizure be "intentional." Such a requirement allows reckless 
shootings to evade review if one focuses solely on the act of shooting and 
not the conduct preceding the shooting. 355 In addition, it creates dis-
agreements as to whether the Court requires objective intent to stop a 
suspect or an objective intent to harm. 
Applying the "show of authority" definition to police shootings al-
lows courts to determine whether the use of a weapon implicates a citi-
zen's right to personal security. A determination that the use of a 
weapon constituted a "show of authority" does not, however, mean that 
the officer has violated a citizen's Fourth Amendment right to personal 
security. A violation only occurs if the use of the weapon was "unrea-
352. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574-76 (1988). 
353. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,451-53 (1990); Brower v. County 
oflnyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599-600 (1989). 
354. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-97. 
355. See supra text accompanying notes 154-92, 216-42, 261-70. 
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sonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In determining 
whether the seizure was reasonable, the Court has considered the serious-
ness of the alleged offense, whether the suspect was resisting apprehen-
sion, and whether the suspect's escape would "pose[ ] an immediate 
threat to the safety of the officers or others .... " 356 In short, a police 
practice is reasonable if it properly balances the need for apprehension 
against the infringement of bo.dily integrity. 
Balancing to resolve both whether there was a Fourth Amendment 
"seizure" and whether a police practice was reasonable may seem confus-
ing. Professor LaFave, however, has justified balancing to determine 
what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure."357 He explains that if 
not all intrusions constitute a Fourth Amendment "seizure," then bal-
ancing is necessary to delineate "precisely where the constitutional line 
should be drawn. 358 Balancing interests to define a Fourth Amendment 
"seizure" is different from balancing to assess unreasonableness. At the 
core of the first issue is the role of the courts in monitoring police prac-
tices. A determination that a practice implicates a person's right to per-
sonal security allows the court to consider the reasonableness of the 
challenged practice. A decision that the Fourth Amendment is not im-
plicated leaves only the states to subject challenged practices to scrutiny. 
Because some states, however, provide police officers with immunity for 
discretionary acts committed during the scope of their employment, 359 
review by state courts may never occur. The dangerous act of shooting 
at citizens thus requires scrutiny by courts under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
V. Application of the "Show of Authority" Definition to the 
Use of Weapons by Police Officers 
In the context of "accidental" shootings, application of the "show of 
authority" standard would allow courts to evaluate some situations in 
356. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 
1, 11-12 (1985). In Garner, the Supreme Court recognized that the officers should not use their 
weapons to kill all fleeing suspects: 
[I]f the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to 
believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction 
of serious physical hann, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, 
and if, where feasible, some warning has been given. 
Jd. See also, Kathryn R. Urbonya, The Constitutionality of High-Speed Pursuits Under the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 205, 248-54 (1991). 
357. LaFave, supra note 28, at 742. 
358. !d. 
359. See, e.g., GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & LoRIE A. FRIDELL, POLICE VEHICLES AND FIRE-
ARMS: INSTRUMENTS OF DEADLY FORCE 26-27 (1991). 
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which police officers use their weapons. Police officers use their weapons 
in a variety of manners: they carry them holstered, withdraw them, keep 
them out while handcuffing suspects, cock them, fire warning shots, and 
fire at objects, such as lights and vehicles, and at suspects. When consid-
ering "accidental shootings," some courts determine that the Fourth 
Amendment is not implicated because they focus exclusively on the last 
use of a gun: a shooting. If courts would consider the prior actions of 
the police, such as the act of holding a gun at a suspect's head, they could 
determine the Fourth Amendment applicable because such an act would 
constitute a "show of authority." Before a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment could be found, the challenged action would have to be 
judged "unreasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
In addition, the doctrine of standing360 would limit the class of individu-
als who could bring claims against police officers for their "show of au-
thority" because the doctrine requires plaintiffs to establish an injury, 
whether physical or psychological. 361 
Courts should adopt a bright-line rule: withdrawal of a gun is a 
Fourth Amendment seizure when it causes physical or psychological 
360. See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1667 (1991) ("at the 
core of the standing doctrine is the requirement that a plaintiff 'allege personal injury fairly 
traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the re-
quested relief.") (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)); City of Los Angeles v. 
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-13 (1983)) (standing issue applies to each request for relief, whether 
for damages or injunctive relief). 
361. The Supreme Court recently discussed the type ofinjury necessary to establish a viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. 
CaNST. amend. VIII; Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000 (1992). The Court stated, 
"[t]he Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual' punishment necessarily ex-
cludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use 
of force is not of a sort 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.' " I d. (quoting Whitley v. 
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986), (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976))). If 
prisoners do not have to allege more than de minimis injuries, then suspects injured during an 
investigation or an arrest should not have to allege greater harm. See, e.g., Elliot v. Thomas, 
937 F.2d 338, 342-43 (7th Cir. 1991) (the Supreme Court's decision in Graham v. Connor, 490 
U.S. 386 (1989), suggests that there is no significant injury requirement for a Fourth Amend-
ment claim), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1242 (1992); Note, Excessive Force Claims: Is Significant 
Bodily Injury the Sine Qua Non to Proving a Fourth Amendment Violation, 58 FORDHAM L. 
REVIEW 739, 759 (1990) ("significant injury requirement runs contrary to the Fourth Amend-
ment"). One Justice also stated that psychological injuries are also actionable. Hudson, 112 S. 
Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Wisniewski v. Kennard, 901 F.2d 1276 (5th Cir. 
1990) (guard put a gun in an inmate's mouth and threatened to shoot)) cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 
309 (1990); see also Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Williams v. 
Boles, 841 F.2d 181, 183 (7th Cir. 1988) (In analyzing a substantive due process claim the 
court emphasized that a " 'state is not free to inflict ... pains without cause just so long as it is 
careful to leave no marks.'")); Brief for The United States at 8-9, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 
386 (1989) (Fourth Amendment should apply if an officer unjustifiably terrorized a suspect 
with an empty gun.). 
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harm. In the alternative, subsequent uses of a gun, such as cocking it, 
firing it, issuing warning shots, or shooting at people, should also be con-
sidered "seizures." Application of the "show of authority" definition to 
some common shooting situations reveals how the Fourth Amendment 
should be implicated. 
The mere presence of a gun on a police officer is insufficient to con-
stitute a "show of authority" under Terry because of the doctrine of "en-
counters."362 Under this doctrine, police officers may ask citizens a few 
questions without implicating the Fourth Amendment. 363 Because of-
ficers generally have their weapons holstered as they approach citizens, 
asking a few questions does not implicate citizens' right to personal se-
curity. The holstered weapon is simply a part of the uniform. 
Withdrawing a weapon, however, should implicate the Fourth 
Amendment when this "show of authority" causes harm, whether physi-
cal or psychological. Although many dispute the boundaries of permissi-
ble encounters, when police officers withdraw their weapons there is an 
obvious assertion of authority. In articulating factors that aid courts in 
determining what constitutes a "seizure," the Mendenhall Court stated 
that one factor was "the display of a weapon by a [police] officer."364 
Although the Court did not explain what it meant by "display,"365 the 
act of withdrawing a gun is an unmistakable escalation of power during a 
confrontation between an officer and a citizen. The act increases the like-
lihood that someone, whether the suspect, the officer, or a bystander, will 
be injured by the gun. This act by a police officer should be sufficient to 
constitute a Fourth Amendment "seizure." 
The focus of Fourth Amendment "seizure" analysis should be on 
the dangerous act of withdrawing a weapon, an act that makes a weapon 
not only more accessible to a police officer but also sometimes more ac-
cessible to a suspect. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has focused 
on the suspect's response to an assertion of authority, sometimes evaluat-
ing the response from the suspect's viewpoint and sometimes from a rea-
sonable person's viewpoint. 366 The act of withdrawing a gun is an 
362. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (No seizure occurred when officers with 
holstered guns approached suspects and asked them questions.). 
363. See supra text accompanying notes 36-47. 
364. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S 544, 554 (1980). 
365. See generally Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2384, 2387-88 (1991) (Court sug-
gested to the lower court on remand that no seizure occurred when an officer approached a 
suspect carrying a gun in "a recognizable zipper pouch."). 
366. In California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991), the Supreme Court stated 
that a "show of authority" alone is insufficient to constitute a Fourth Amendment "seizure." 
It focused on the suspect's actual response to the assertion of authority, a footchase between 
the officer and the suspect. It stated that a "seizure" occurs only when the suspect stops in 
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assertion of power that is markedly different from the act of questioning 
a suspect, of examining identification, or of following a suspect. In these 
latter contexts, focusing on how a reasonable person would respond or 
how the suspect in fact did respond is a part of any court's struggle to 
define actions that implicate the Fourth Amendment, and those that do 
not. The act of withdrawing a gun, however, is an act that clearly signi-
fies that a suspect is involved with a governmental actor, an act that in no 
way resembles ordinary discourse with other citizens. 
By determining that this action constitutes a Fourth Amendment 
"seizure," courts would then proceed to examine the justification for this 
action. This view of the Fourth Amendment is consistent with the fact-
specific jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment. 367 For example, in the 
context of arresting suspects in their homes, they have scrutinized each 
action by a police officer to determine whether it complied with the 
Fourth Amendment. They have evaluated a police officer's authority to 
enter, 368 to search the suspect, 369 to search the area near the suspect/70 
to examine other rooms, 371 and to stay in the home. 372 Although these 
situations implicate the Fourth Amendment because they involve 
searches, the Court has used all the circumstances of the search process 
to explain reduced levels of justification by a police officers for their ac-
tions. 373 In short, the Court has examined each action in relationship to 
other actions. If withdrawing a weapon were considered a Fourth 
Amendment "seizure," then each use of the weapon after this act could 
response to the assertion of authority. Id. In contrast, in Mendenhall and its progeny the 
Court attempted to define the line between a Fourth Amendment stop and an encounter. See 
supra text accompanying notes 48-76. The Court questioned whether a "reasonable person 
would have believed that he was not free to leave." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. Under this 
definition the suspect need not stop in response to the officer's conduct in order to implicate 
the Fourth Amendment. 
367. See supra text accompanying notes 48-76. 
368. See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220-22 (1981) (search warrant neces-
sary to enter third-party's home to arrest suspect); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 
(1980) (arrest warrant is necessary to enter home of suspect). 
369. See, e.g., Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 543 (1990) (per curiam) (search preceding an 
arrest can not be used to provide probable cause to justify the arrest). 
370. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (police officer may search 
"the area into which an arrestee might ... grab a weapon or evidentiary items"). 
371. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1098 (1990) (protective sweep of area 
permissible if officers have reasonable suspicion that another may be present in the area and 
that this person poses a danger to officers or others), reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 1011 (1991). 
372. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511 (1978) (after fire of home is extin-
guished, re-entry to search for evidence of arson is impermissible under some circumstances). 
373. See, e.g., Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1098 (protective sweep requires only reasonable suspicion, 
not probable cause); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973) (search incident 
to an arrest does not require any independent belief of harm or of items of evidentiary value). 
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also be scrutinized to determine whether it was "reasonable" within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
Even if the act of withdrawing a gun were not a Fourth Amendment 
"seizure, once an officer attempts to handcuff a suspect, a "seizure" has 
occurred under any definition that a court may use. Because the Fourth 
Amendment has been implicated, courts should then evaluate whether 
the use of a weapon during the process was reasonable within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment. This approach is similar to the court's 
approach when considering each aspect of an officer's conduct during a 
search. 
In the alternative, even if the act of withdrawing a gun and using it 
to maintain control during an arrest were not a "seizure," the cocking of 
a gun must be a "seizure" because this action dramatically increases the 
likelihood of an injury. Although a subsequent firing of a gun may be 
unintentional, the act of cocking a gun is a deliberate act. The conse-
quences of this action are potentially lethal. In contrast to annoying 
questioning by police officers, this act signifies not only potential bodily 
injury, but also potential psychological harm. This assertion of authority 
by police officers is like the practice the Supreme Court considered in 
Terry. It is a practice necessary for effective law enforcement, yet it re-
quires special justification for it to be constitutional. Determining that 
the act of cocking a gun constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure" 
would allow courts to evaluate the circumstances confronting officers 
when they decide to use a potentially lethal weapon. 
The act of intentionally firing a warning shot should also be a 
Fourth Amendment "seizure" because this action can present even 
greater risks than the actions that precede it. The danger of the warning 
shot is dependent upon the likelihood of individuals near the area of 
shooting. A shot fired during daylight in an open field as a police officer 
attempts to apprehend a suspect is quite different from firing a warning 
shot at night in a congested area. Although the officer may not have 
intended to injure a third-party or even the suspect, the firing creates an 
serious risk. 
Similarly, when police officers intentionally shoot at vehicles, their 
conduct should constitute a Fourth Amendment "seizure," regardless of 
whether the suspect stops in response to the show of authority or 
whether a bullet injures a suspect or passenger. Shooting at a moving 
target is a dramatic assertion of authority, one that may deprive citizens 
of their lives. 
When evaluating police shootings of vehicles, some courts, however, 
have imposed numerous restrictions on what constitutes a Fourth 
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Amendment "seizure." They have determined that no "seizure" occurs 
when the suspect continues to flee or when a known passenger is injured 
by mistak.e.374 Under this narrow view, application of the Fourth 
Amendment is directly related to the skill level of the shooting police 
officers: the more skilled they are in shooting, the more likely the Fourth 
Amendment applies; if police officers lack skill and miss their targets, 
then the Fourth Amendment is not applicable. This narrow view fails to 
account for the inherent risk in all shootings and likelihood of serious 
harm arising from poor training. In addition, under the narrow view of a 
Fourth Amendment "seizure," no local governmental entity could be 
held liable for its failure to train police officers in the use of deadly weap-
ons because a predicate to this liability is a determination that an officer 
who shot his weapon violated the Fourth Amendment. Yet, before a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment can be found, a court must first de-
termine that the officer effected a Fourth Amendment "seizure." 
A determination that an intentional shooting of a weapon consti-
tutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure" is built upon the need to balance 
the interest in personal security against the need to subject this danger-
ous police practice to scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment. Few citi-
zens would contend that a police officer should be able to fire multiple 
rounds at a suspect's car if the officer believes that the driver has just 
stolen a candy bar. A narrow view of what constitutes a Fourth Amend-
ment "seizure," such as the one suggested in Brower would not allow 
courts to subject this practice to scrutiny. 
By considering the different ways officers use their weapons, courts 
would be able to examine the reasonableness of the acts preceding an 
"accidental shooting." By using the "show of authority" standard for 
Fourth Amendment "seizures," courts would not need to determine 
whether the officer intended to stop a suspect or to harm the injured 
persons. They would also not need to define the relationship between the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment when the shooting injury occurs 
during an arrest or shortly after it. Additionally, the suspect's response 
to the assertion of authority would be irrelevant. In the context of police 
shootings, a "show of authority" standard creates a bright-line rule, one 
that compels officers to evaluate the reasonableness of withdrawing a 
weapon in the same manner that they consider the reasonableness of 
other actions they take during investigations and arrests. 
Once an officer has effected a Fourth Amendment "seizure," then a 
jury will determine the reasonableness of the use of a weapon. At this 
374. See supra text accompanying notes 149, 261-70. 
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stage, the Supreme Court has articulated factors to assist juries in this 
determination. 375 
Conclusion 
Courts have disagreed as to how to evaluate "accidental" shootings 
by police officers under the Fourth Amendment. Central to the disagree-
ment is a court's interpretation of what constitutes a Fourth Amendment 
"seizure." In applying the Supreme Court's three "seizure" definitions in 
Terry, Mendenhall, and Brower, some courts have concluded that an "ac-
cidental" shooting, even one that results in death, cannot be a Fourth 
Amendment "seizure." These courts have erroneously focused on the 
last act committed by the officer-the "accidental" shot. By looking at 
the actions that precede the shooting, courts can discern how the Fourth 
Amendment is implicated when police officers withdraw their guns. 
Withdrawal of the gun is a "show of authority" and thus a Fourth 
Amendment "seizure" under Terry v. Ohio. Courts should renew the vi-
tality of Terry by applying it to the context of police shootings. 
To determine what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure," the 
Court has implicitly balanced the interest of subjecting a police practice 
to constitutional scrutiny against the state's interest in law enforcement. 
Balancing is necessary in order to protect the right to personal security. 
While citizens want a law enforcement agency to protect them from 
criminals, they do not want their right to personal security undermined 
by the police practice that is supposed to protect them. When police 
officers engage in "encounters" by asking citizens a few brief questions, 
the law enforcement interest in crime prevention and detection clearly 
outweighs the de minimis intrusion. Accordingly, the Fourth Amend-
ment is not implicated, and police officers may engage in this practice 
without being subject to scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment. In con-
trast, when police officers withdraw and use weapons during their inves-
tigations and arrests, the right to personal security is implicated because 
of the inherent danger present. 
Police officers may cause two types of injury when they use their 
weapons during investigations and arrests: physical injuries and psycho-
logical injuries. These injuries may occur regardless of whether the in-
jured person stops in response to the assertion of authority. The 
Supreme Court's examination of other police practices such as question-
ing suspects, following them, or chasing them on foot has implicated the 
Fourth Amendment only when a suspect actually stops in response to an 
375. See supra text accompanying notes 119-290. 
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assertion of authority or when officers intentionally use physical force to 
stop the suspect. These restrictions have no place in evaluating the police 
practice of using weapons during investigations and arrests. The fact-
specific nature of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has logically evolved 
from assessing the intrusiveness of various police practices. The deliber-
ate act of withdrawing a weapon during an investigation significantly in-
creases the intrusiveness of the meeting between officers and suspects. 
Determining that the Fourth Amendment is implicated does not 
necessarily mean that an officer has violated the Fourth Amendment by 
the withdrawal of a weapon, a common action in policing. A violation of 
the Fourth Amendment occurs only if the withdrawal or subsequent use 
of a gun was "unreasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. 376 
This second determination does not require courts to automatically 
exonerate all officers from liability, nor to automatically impose liability 
for negligent shootings. In Graham v. Connor, 377 the Supreme Court ar-
ticulated factors to aid courts in determining whether the use of force 
was unreasonable: the "severity of the crime at issue, whether the sus-
pect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and 
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by 
flight."378 Although the Court did not indicate the weight of these fac-
tors, in Tennessee v. Garner, 379 the Supreme Court expressly stated that 
police officers may not shoot suspects just because they are attempting to 
evade capture. The Court declared, "It is not better that all felony sus-
pects die than that they escape."380 
This determination does not require courts to decide whether the 
officers acted negligently, grossly negligent, recklessly, or intentionally. 
Nor does it allow courts to create a per se rule that officers may always 
withdraw their weapons during investigations and arrests. Assessing rea-
sonableness is a function of the alleged crime committed and an objective 
officers' assessment of the danger present in confrontation with a particu-
lar suspect. Unless society is prepared to believe that all suspects are 
armed, the use of weapons by police officers is dependent upon the partie-
376. See, e.g., Simons v. Montgomery County Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 33 (4th Cir. 
1985) ("We perceive nothing improper if an officer conducting a search for narcotics under a 
valid search warrant enters the room to be searched with her gun drawn."), cert. denied, 474 
u.s. 1054 (1986). 
377. 490 u.s. 386 (1989). 
378. Id. at 396. 
379. 471 u.s. 11 (1985). 
380. Id. at 11. 
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ular circumstances confronting them. This fact-specific inquiry is what 
protects a citizen's right to personal security. 
Whether a shooting was intended or just an "accident," the Fourth 
Amendment is implicated because the acts prior to the shooting consti-
tuted a "show of authority." By focusing on these acts, courts may as-
sess whether the police were reasonable within meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. The inherent danger presented by the use of weapons, 
whether by the police or by suspects, is the core of the reasonableness 
inquiry. This inquiry allows police officers to use their weapons only 
when suspects present a danger to police officers or others. It properly 
protects suspects, bystanders, and police officers from unjustified 
shootings. 
